



## **HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE**

### **BNGSL SELLAFIELD, BNGSL DRIGG, AND UKAEA WINDSCALE**

### **WEST CUMBRIA SITES STAKEHOLDER GROUP**

### **QUARTERLY REPORT FOR 1 JANUARY TO 31 MARCH 2006**

## **FOREWORD**

This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above sites available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at BNGSL Sellafield and Drigg, and UKAEA Windscale.

These reports are distributed quarterly and will be available on the Internet. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) attend WCSSG meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact HSE, Nuclear Safety Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.

This report will be put onto the HSE Website at

<http://www.hse.gov/nsd/nsdhome.htm> under "Local Liaison Committee Reports"

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

NII Inspectors made a total of 75 visits to the Sellafield, Calder Hall, Windscale and

the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) sites during the quarter. This involved a total of 259 days on site (see Table 1 for details). The more significant issues identified during these inspections are summarised below.

## **2 BNGSL SELLAFIELD**

### **2.1 GENERAL SITE MATTERS**

The NII previously reported that, in response to recent events on the Sellafield site, a team comprising HSE and Environmental Agency inspectors would be looking into safety culture/management issues. However due to the need to allocate effort to the Buncefield event, and the recent reorganisation of NII, resource has not been available to progress this work. Resource will be allocated to the project in the forthcoming quarter.

#### **2.1.1 Visit to Sellafield**

The Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive (Policy) of HSE visited the Sellafield site on Wednesday 22nd March 2006. They met with the BNGSL management led by Mr Barry Snelson and the BNG Chief Executive Lawry Haynes. They viewed a number of plants. Some of those viewed were current operational plant and some plant under remediation. The purpose of the visit was to allow the HSE team to understand the complexity of the plant NII regulate and the nature and complexity of the issues that are considered. It gave the HSE team to here the opinions and concerns of the BNG & BNGSL directly. The HSE found the visit very informative.

#### **2.1.2 Level 1 Demonstration Emergency Exercise**

NII Inspectors observed the Sellafield Site Level 1 demonstration exercise held Thursday 30th March 2006. The exercise was assessed to be an adequate demonstration of the BNGSLs arrangements for responding to an emergency on the site. Lessons learnt included the continuing need to be able to reconcile the number of staff on site and the need to place staff on the site under cover as soon as they are at risk.

#### **2.1.3 Team Inspections**

NII Inspectors completed "Alarm Management" inspections of Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage Plants, over two days in mid February. The licensee was found to be making broadly acceptable progress in improving alarm management at the main plant control room, (significant improvements being observed since the previous alarm inspection there in 2005), but substantial further work remains to be done, given the highly hazardous nature of the materials being processed and the significant future life of these plants. In March, NII delivered a presentation explaining why NII viewed alarm management as being important at Sellafield, at the licensee's two day "Alarm Management" seminar. This seminar was a promising development, strongly supported by NII, as the licensee received training on HSE's approved guidance on alarm management and also shared experience of implementing improvements across the site operating units. NII will continue to apply resource to inspect the licensee's progress with "Alarm Management", following a planned change of project inspector in April.

Also, it is worth reporting in the WCSSG report our ongoing inspection of the "shield door improvement project", also under the "Team Inspections" section.

The NII project inspector met with the licensee in January, in order to inspect progress against the "shield door improvements" project, (the subject of an earlier Specification from NII, requiring annual reports, until completion, to the licensee's Nuclear Safety Committee). The licensee reported acceptable progress with ongoing improvements across the site and was currently undertaking a range of internal audits against the project requirements. NII plans to inspect examples of implementation on the plants, as the work nears completion, with a view to potentially 'closing out' this project by around the middle of this year.

#### **2.1.4 IRRT Mission**

At the request of the UK Government, an IAEA team of six experts visited HSE / NSD at Redgrave Court in late March 2006 to conduct an International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission with reduced scope. The UK is the first major nuclear power plant State to host this type of mission under the IAEA's modular approach to its IRRS.

The purpose of the mission was to conduct a review of how HSE intends to go about the appraisal of reactor designs in advance of specific proposals for a new build, to review the effectiveness of HSE / NSD and to exchange information and experience in the regulation of nuclear safety in selected predetermined areas considered by the IRRS. The selected areas are: legislative and governmental responsibilities; authority, responsibilities and functions of the regulatory body; organisation of the regulatory body; authorisation process and review and assessment.

During the review the team recognised that HSE / NSD has taken a number of initiatives to ensure that NSD moves forwards being a "world class nuclear regulator" improving its effectiveness and efficiency while facing a number of new challenges.

The IAEA will complete their report of the mission (which will include recommendations, suggestions and highlight current good practice) within 30 days of the mission and HSE / NSD will subsequently respond to this. Further information will be available on the HSE / NSD website.

## **2.2 INCIDENTS**

### **2.2.1 High radiation levels, Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) facility.**

NII has reported that an incident occurred in the Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) facility on 4 December 2005 during which high levels of radiation were detected in the working area during routine operations to sample highly active liquor.

NII has now received BNGSL's investigation report. This is a thorough assessment of the incident and it presents a number of recommendations to improve the safety of sampling and to improve the management of operational experience feedback. NII is considering this report and will confirm its findings next quarter.

The investigation into the incident revealed that further improvements could be made to safety during sampling operations. (Sampling is an essential component of HALES operations.) NII made it clear that engineered improvements are necessary to ensure the safety of future sampling operations. In response, BNGSL put forward proposals to fit engineered isolations to prevent a recurrence.

## **2.3 MAGNOX REPROCESSING OPERATIONS**

### **2.3.1 Reprocessing Operations**

Following detailed inspections NII has required BNGSL to make improvements to the safe systems of work process. BNGSL has put in place a programme of work to address the issues and NII will continue to monitor progress in this area.

Reprocessing during the period has been reduced due to plant downtime in Magnox Reprocessing and an associated plant.

### **2.3.2 Fuel Handling Plant (FHP) and Pond Conditions**

The pond water radioactivity contamination level has reduced during the period and is at the 2000 Bq/ml level. NII continues to monitor BNGSL's efforts to reduce pond water activity.

### **2.3.3 Magnox Product Finishing and Storage Facility (Magnox PF&S)**

On the 10<sup>th</sup> October 2005 NII issued BNGSL with Consent under LC31 (2) to restart feeds to the conditioning vessels of Finishing Line 5 at Sellafield. This consent was subject to 13 commitments from BNGSL to address safety related issues arising from NII's assessment of their submission for restart of the plant. At the end of March only 4 of these commitments remain outstanding.

The commitment to provide a permanent neutron monitoring system, which is essential to ensure plant risks are tolerable and ALARP with respect to fissile powder and liquor accumulations, remains outstanding. The commitment to deliver this system by the end of May 2006 has been delayed and will not become available until January 2007. The delay has arisen due to poor assumptions in equipment availability and transferability of other systems in use for similar purposes on other Sellafield plant. Discussions with BNGSL have given confidence that the approach being adopted for planning and delivering this system is more thorough than previously adopted for the timescales offered for restart.

Recognising the significance of this system an additional commitment given by BNGSL in support of restart of the plant was to develop and implement an interim neutron monitoring system until the permanent system was designed, installed and commissioned. Since restarting feeds to finishing line 5, BNGSL have been accumulating neutron monitoring data from gloveboxes to develop and substantiate an interim neutron monitoring system. Following inspection of arrangements and discussions with PF&S staff and NII's criticality specialist it is judged that the interim neutron monitoring system is providing an improvement to safety within B299 and that BNGSL's approach to developing and implementing this system is adequate and sufficient to substantiate continued operation until the delivery of the permanent neutron monitoring system in January 2007.

The site inspector for PF&S will continue to monitor the progress in delivery of the permanent neutron monitoring system and the adequacy of the interim neutron monitoring system closely.

## **2.4 THORP OPERATIONS**

### **2.4.1 THORP - Feed Clarification Cell Leak Investigation**

NII's investigation report has still to be finalised at the end of this period. The findings from this report will be communicated to BNGSL via letter in order to give them as much notice as possible of HSE recommendations and requirements to further inform the Company's thinking prior to restart. Consideration is being given to further regulatory action.

## **2.5 HIGH ACTIVE LIQUOR WASTE PLANTS**

### **2.5.2 HAL Stocks**

BNGSL continues to provide NII with monthly reports summarising the quantities of highly active liquor (HAL) contained in the highly active storage tanks (HASTs). These figures are used by NII to judge whether BNGSL continues to meet the HAL Specification issued in 2000, which provides a limit on the amount of HAL that can be stored at any time and promotes HAL stocks reduction. Continued good performance of WVP during 2005/6 coupled with the extended outage at THORP has meant that HAL stocks are currently at their lowest levels since the Specification was issued and well below that required by the Specification. Consequently NII is content that BNGSL has kept within the requirements of the Specification.

NII will review the Specification during 2006 and, if it appears necessary in the interests of safety, we will change it in the light of our accumulated experience and BNGSL's forward predictions of future HAL generation and WVP performance.

### **2.5.3 Highly Active Liquor evaporative capacity**

There is an ongoing need for facilities to allow evaporation of highly active raffinates and effluents and, on the basis of current plans, this need will continue in support of site clean-up long after reprocessing operations at Sellafield cease. NII is concerned that the existing evaporators may be removed from service before completing the currently projected lifetime needs because the heating/cooling coils are approaching the end of their design lives. NII therefore strongly supports the project that is underway to build a new highly active evaporator (Evaporator D) and considers that this is fully justified on safety grounds. NII, along with the Environment Agency and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, is in regular dialogue with BNGSL in respect of this project. Furthermore NII considers that there is enough uncertainty in the ongoing operation of the existing evaporators that it would be prudent to consider building a second new evaporator (Evaporator E).

### **2.5.5 Windscale Vitrification Plant (WVP)**

BNGSL continued to record good rates of vitrified container production during the quarter. BNGSL is actively pursuing further improvements in throughput and discussions are continuing on proposed improvements to the container production processes.

NII observed a building emergency exercise carried out on 7 March, designed to train WVP staff in dealing with emergencies. This simulated a seismic event and failure of the main and emergency cooling water systems for WVP, causing a simulated radioactive release. The need to restore cooling water meant that emergency supplies from the river Calder had to be used, and the Sellafield Fire & Rescue Services were involved to connect up hoses and run water from the Calder to WVP. Overall NII considered the exercise to have been successful: the scenario was managed well with a good sense of realism and enthusiasm.

### **2.5.6 Cs 137 Discharge, Vitrification Plants**

NII has previously reported to the WCSSG that, in late April 2005, an incident occurred in Vitrification Line 1 which resulted in an aerial discharge of Caesium 137. It was found that the rolling twelve month authorised discharge limit for Caesium 137 for the Vitrification Plant discharge stack was exceeded by fifteen percent. In conjunction with the Environment Agency, NII monitored BNGSL's response and its actions to address their recommendations.

A follow-up meeting was held in March 2006 to enable BNGSL to present to the Environment Agency and NII a review of work undertaken by BNGSL in response to the incident. Included are improved clarity of plant states and related interventions, improved documentation and human performance training. The work should have lasting benefit to safe operation of the plant and should minimise the risk of a similar incident in the future.

### **2.5.7 Residue Export Facility**

The project is progressing well with all major plant and equipment installed and inactive commissioning has started. NII is engaging regularly with BNGSL on regulatory issues in advance of the start of active commissioning early in 2007. Standards of housekeeping and health and safety are generally good, although efforts continue to be made by BNGSL to learn from a number of minor conventional safety incidents and to improve safety awareness. A more significant incident occurred on 17 March 2006 when, during the course of rigging operations prior to commencement of lifting, a load (0.75te) was dislodged from its packing, trapping an operative's foot. This resulted in three small bones being broken. BNGSL halted all REF operations temporarily while a review of safety was carried out. BNGSL is investigating the incident.

## **2.6 MOX OPERATIONS**

### **2.6.1 Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) Commissioning and Operation**

MOX commissioning operations continued in SMP, whilst contributing to the manufacture the next 12 fuel assemblies. Safety performance has remained generally good. Plant inspection was again limited due to NII priorities elsewhere on site, but review of safety performance and progress of the Consent to Operate Safety (CTO) case continued at quarterly project meetings.

The BNGSL review of the safety case for each plant area has been completed and the revised safety cases implemented on plant. A joint 'readiness for Consent to Operate' inspection of radwaste and discharge aspects was carried out by NII and Environment Agency Inspectors in March 2006 with a good outcome.

NII is currently awaiting delivery of the safety case documentation and the formal request for Consent to Operate. Liaison with the Environment Agency on CTO matters has continued. The application by BNGSL for Consent to Operate (CTO) is expected to be around spring 2006, but in the meantime, the MOX commissioning phase will continue, until HSE/NII have completed consideration of the request for CTO. Assessment of the revised CTO safety case and the undertaking of NII readiness inspections are likely to be constrained by limited NII resources.

## **2.7 WASTE TREATMENT & DECOMMISSIONING**

### **2.7.2 Waste Treatment Complex (WTC)**

The Waste Treatment Complex has been undergoing extensive commissioning over recent years. In March NII granted permission for it to enter the final phase of commissioning. It is anticipated that the facility will be ready for operations towards the end of 2006.

### **2.7.3 Engineered Drum Store**

Construction of Store 3 was completed in 2005 and commissioning started in January 2006. Following a satisfactory inspection of the commissioning arrangements by NII in March, the facility entered full operations. This facility provides valuable additional storage capacity to the EDS complex.

### **2.7.4 Decommissioning Plants**

Several facilities undergoing decommissioning require internal radioactive materials to be removed by operators wearing Airfed suits. The selection, storage and use of these suits are a very important contributor to the safety of the operators performing such work. NII undertook an in depth inspection of the way that these suits are used for decommissioning work, and were generally satisfied that the licensees arrangements for controlling the use of these suits is adequate. Several recommendations were made, principally with regard to the nature of suit construction, operator recovery procedures and the degree of protection afforded to wearers.

## **2.8 LEGACY PONDS & SILOS**

### **2.8.1 Piles Fuels Storage Pond and Magnox Storage Pond**

BNGSL continue to make progress with the enabling measures towards ultimate sludge retrieval from the Magnox Storage Pond. A project to remove samples of sludge from one of the bays is well underway, and a separate project to remove ILW scrap from another bay has been completed. Installation of the Gantry Refurbishment System for the Magnox Storage Pond is having to be re-thought as trials for in-situ construction indicate potential problems with dose uptake and working at height issues.

BNGSL have now completed their investigation report into the circumstances of the damaged pipe in the vicinity of the Magnox Storage Pond. As well as acknowledging the need for significant improvement in local arrangements (a programme of measures is in place) the need for site wide learning and feedback has been addressed.

A number of fuel skips in the Piles Storage pond have been relocated to enable movement restrictions in parts of the pond to be lifted. This should enable progress with retrievals projects to resume.

Both Ponds have agreed in principle a set of NII regulatory milestones for the 2006/7 regulatory schedules.

## **2.9 SITE & PLANT SERVICES, INCLUDING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT**

### **2.9.1 Site - Separation Area rollback project**

The project was started in 2002 as response to NII concerns over the control of contamination, waste accumulation and general housekeeping in Separation Area. OCNS also had security concerns, and the scope of the project was broadened as a consequence. BNGSL proposed the concept of a number of 'island' sites to be created within Separation Area. Construction started on fencing for two of the sites, but the project was suspended due to problems resulting from complex plant ownership issues.

A meeting was held between NII, OCNS, BNGSL and NDA to discuss the status of the Separation Area rollback project. BNGSL had requested the meeting to clarify the aims of the project. The need for the project to address the original concerns was re-affirmed by NII and OCNS. OCNS also confirmed that it required BNGSL to meet an agreed deadline of March 2007 for the completion of the first 'island'. BNGSL will progress the resolution of the ownership problems, and will produce a detailed proposal for the 'island' sites.

### **2.9.2 BNFL Technology Centre (BTC)**

The progress of BTC active commissioning was discussed with BNGSL and Nexia. The latest summary and detailed programmes were reviewed, and each of commissioning phases 1, 2, and 3 were discussed. The active commissioning of Phase 1 (the low active facilities) is ongoing, and has been reviewed by the BTC OCM team who were satisfied with progress. The programme for the inactive commissioning of BTC Phase 2 (the high active glovebox lines) and Phase 3 (the high active cells) is behind schedule because of the extensive re-work required on the facilities and equipment in Phase 2.

The NDA Expenditure Review Panel have confirmed to Nexia that Phases 2 and 3 are not to be actively commissioned by the BTC project team, but the team are to complete inactive commissioning. Full active commissioning of Phase 1 remains within the scope of the BTC project team, and this includes the separation of the active ventilation system that is shared between Phases 1 and 2.

NDA have informed NII that the funding for the Nexia rationalisation project will now be the subject of a review by the NDA Internal Audit Team, which means that the scope of the project will be put on hold pending the outcome of the review. The rationalisation project includes the UKAEA site improvement works until 31st March 2006, relocation works following the completion of BTC, and lease extension works for the existing Nexia facilities.

### **2.9.3 Analytical Services**

## Potential overexposure

In October, two contract joiners were working in a former plutonium-handling laboratory, and during removal of part of the skirting board, the two installed air samplers in the lab went into alarm with high  $\alpha$  activity. The provisional dose assessment from urine samples for one of the contractors was 18.4 mSv, which would give a cumulative year to date dose (YTD) of 19.4 mSv. The final internal dose estimate for the event was 15.8 mSv which would give a cumulative YTD dose of ~17 mSv.

The Site Inspector and a Radiological Protection (RP) Specialist Inspector carried out a follow-up inspection including a visit to the laboratory, discussions on work control with the work supervisors, and discussions with the Radiation Protection Advisor and the Approved Dosimetry Service. BNGSL have compiled a draft Board of Inquiry report that contains several recommendations for future intrusive work in the Analytical Services Building. The NII raised concerns over the operation of the work control system and the RP actions that were undertaken following the event. The Site Inspector and RP Specialist are to consider what further investigation is required.

### **2.9.4 Utilities**

#### Fellside CHP event

There was an event at Fellside CHP plant when the Gas Turbine (GT) wash tank serving GT No 3 became very hot due to turbine gases entering the tank. The heat caused bitumen on the pipework feeding the tank to become very hot and fume extensively, but there were no flames. The Site Fire Brigade attended and the SECC was set up. The area around the event was evacuated, a roll call was taken, and the GT was shut down and made safe. There were no injuries to personnel, and a Site Incident was not declared.

As GT No 1 was out of service for maintenance, this meant that only 2 methods of raising steam were available, so Utilities Aux Boiler 5 was energised on standby for HLWP as a precaution. There was minimal disruption to the Site steam supply. The Utilities Technical team advised that the wash tank pipework to GT No 3 could be blanked off. This was completed, and GT No 3 was successfully returned to service on the following day. Investigations are underway to determine the cause of the incident.

## **2.10 EFFLUENT & ENCAPSULATION**

### **2.10.1 B241**

Modifications to the spillback cabinets on the Buffer tank to allow visual inspection for leaks have now been completed. BNGSL have also developed revised operating instructions for the spillbacks to reduce the risk of leaks reoccurring. Following meetings with the site inspector for the Effluent and Encapsulation Plant, BNGSL intend to seek NII's agreement to an extension of active commissioning of the Floc retrieval operations during April 2006.

## **2.10.2 ILW Storage Strategy**

In response to a request to keep NII informed of progress on delivering suitable and sufficient storage for encapsulated waste, BNGSL has written a further letter on their strategy for storage of future arisings of operational (Magnox and Thorp) ILW waste post 2008. Current projections show EPS2 being full around this date. BNGSL's letter reaffirms that their position remains unchanged and that they are committed to maintaining a programme of EPS3 availability by 2010. However, BNGSL also indicate that they are reviewing the scope of EPS3 to accommodate both reprocessing and retrievals arisings, where previously only reprocessing arisings were being considered. Consequently, there will be a delay of between three to six months in the delivery of EPS 3, which they judge can be accommodated due to reduction in the rate of store filling resulting from the current operational status of Thorp, the interruption in Magnox reprocessing last year and the delays encountered by the B241 floc retrieval project..

A meeting between BNGSL and NII has been arranged to take place in May 2006 to discuss the waste storage strategy further and to allow NII to explore BNGSL's intent to use transport aisles in EPS2 and their proposal to include additional waste streams into EPS3.

## **3 CALDER HALL**

### **3.1 ROUTINE MATTERS**

#### **3.1.1 Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 (IRRs)**

A specialist inspector carried out an inspection of Calder Hall's compliance with sections of the IRRs concerned with the management of dose. Particularly, we were seeking confidence that dose being accrued in work to remove asbestos from the heat exchangers through which the carbon dioxide coolant passed when the reactors were operating, is ALARP. As asbestos removal is a long job, there is a possibility of workers accumulating small doses that would approach the current limits set down in the IRRs without adequate dose management. We were satisfied that dose for this work was being managed in accordance with the IRRs and that improvements were being pursued to reduce doses.

#### **3.1.2 Emergency Exercise**

Calder Hall carries out its own routine exercises to test its local emergency arrangements, and invites NII to witness one of these annually. These are in addition to the biannual, larger Sellafield site wide Level 1 demonstration exercises. In January, the Calder Hall site inspector and another NII inspector witnessed one of these Calder Hall exercises. Calder Hall's main aim was to demonstrate its emergency response with revised manning arrangements on shift. Although it coped with the exercise scenario, during the post exercise de-brief, Calder Hall explained that there were areas where it considered it could improve its performance. Therefore, we accepted Calder Hall's offer to observe another routine exercise when it hopes to show the improvements.

## **4 UKAEA WINDSCALE**

### **4.1 Improvement Notices**

The two Improvement Notices that were served on UKAEA and Nexia Solutions for operations in B13 had a scheduled date for compliance of 30<sup>th</sup> November, now

extended to 1<sup>st</sup> September 2006.

There was a second event in B13 on 17<sup>th</sup> February that had many similarities to the event last year that led to the Improvement Notices. NII investigated the circumstances of this event and wrote to Nexia Solutions. Nexia has withdrawn one of its work instructions, which halts use of the shield door that is used to access Cave 1. This shield door will not be used until all the relevant Safe System of Work documents are approved.

#### **4.1.2 Operational Safety Case**

NII reported in previous quarters that it is concerned at the range of weaknesses that are in the B13 operational safety case, and therefore issued a Specification under Licence Condition 13, Licence Instrument 512, that requires UKAEA to seek advice from its Southern Nuclear Safety Committee on

- The adequacy of UKAEA's procedures for the production and assessment of safety cases, and
- The adequacy of the endorsement of the Safety Report that describes the B13 safety case taking into account the range and importance of the issues raised by NII.

The Safety Committee has advised UKAEA of a number of improvements that it should make to its process for producing safety cases. UKAEA has committed to complete these improvements by April 2006. For the second topic, the Nuclear Safety Committee has advised that operations can continue, but has agreed a schedule of safety improvement milestones dates that must be met. Each date has a consequence of not meeting the date, generally that specific operations must stop.

NII has written to UKAEA accepting that the Safety Committee that the papers discussed by the Nuclear Safety Committee address the issues raised by NII.

#### **4.2 Pile 1**

NII has made an initial assessment of the new Operational Safety Case (OSC) for Pile 1. Discussions have continued, and are close to a mutually acceptable position that will allow NII to agree that the OSC can be implemented.

NII is pleased that planning work to look at the effects of removing a period of interim care and maintenance from the Piles decommissioning plan is progressing well. The acceleration would substantially bring forward total removal of the hazard from the reactors.

#### **4.3 Emergency Exercises**

No exercises were observed at Windscale this quarter.

#### **4.4 Life Time Plan (LTP)**

What used to be called Life Cycle Baseline and Near Term Work Plan is now called the Life Time Plan. The timescales for the work described above for B13 and Pile 1 means that the detail is not yet included in the LTP. NII acknowledges that the recent work to produce an integrated plan for the whole of B12/13/14, described above, is likely to address the longstanding NII/NDA concerns that the previous plans did not have adequate detail for B13.

#### **4.5 Leases**

Work is continuing to tidy the leasing of buildings on Windscale site that were overlooked when the legal transfers required by the formation of NDA were implemented.

Building B25. This new area has been requested by BNGSL to enable access for construction work in connection with B29 pond. A Consent under LC3 has been signed by NII; BNGSL will now be able to work under its own supervision.

Building B546.1 occupied by the BNGSL demolition group. This was overlooked during the implementation of the transfer schemes. A new agreement is being developed along the same lines as the B25 agreement. NII and EA have identified some areas of management and recording of waste that require enhancing to comply with the new EA discharge authorisations and are still awaiting a response from BNGSL.

Buildings B12 and B14. The lease arrangement that permits Nexia Solutions to occupy and use parts of B12 and B14 expired on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2006. UKAEA and Nexia have developed a new arrangement, using a Licence to Occupy. NII is now dealing with the requests for Consents for these Licences.

#### **5 Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) at Drigg**

BNGSL's application for Planning Permission for higher stacking of Half Height iso containers (HHISOs) in vault as temporary storage until vault 9 is ready has been granted subject to a number of conditions. NII is seeking assurance from BNGSL that relative ground settlement beneath the higher stacks does not prejudice the higher stacked HHISOs being retrievable.

The space constraints for LLW disposal at the repository remain problematic and further contingency measures (in addition to the higher stacking noted above) may need to be developed.

Further meetings have been held to discuss the requirements and formation of a Site Licence Company that can operate independently of the Sellafield organisation to allow the NDA to invite competition to manage the site in 2007 in line with its published strategy. A programme of key milestones is beginning to emerge.

## HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE

**TABLE 1**

**QUARTERLY RETURNS FOR  
SELLAFIELD, CALDER HALL, DRIGG AND WINDSCALE**

**DURING THE QUARTER**

**1 JANUARY TO 31 MARCH 2005**

	BNGSL SELLAFIELD <sup>1</sup>	BNGSL CALDER HALL <sup>2</sup>	BNGSL DRIGG	UKAEA WINDSCALE
NUMBER OF VISITS	58	8	0	6
INSPECTION DAYS ON SITE	223.5	12	2	21.5
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS <sup>3</sup>	0	0	0	0
Incidents in the quarter likely to be published in HSE's quarterly "Statement of Nuclear Incidents at Nuclear Installations"	0	0	0	0
CONSENTS, APPROVALS	2	0	0	0
LICENCE INSTRUMENTS	10	0	0	0

<sup>1</sup> The figures shown for BNGSL Sellafield are those for BNGSL's chemical plants. They do not include figures for the plants within the Electricity Generation Group (see note 2 below)

<sup>2</sup> The figures shown for BNGSL Calder Hall are those for the plants on the Sellafield site operated by (or for) the Electricity Generation group, primarily Calder Hall nuclear power plant.

<sup>3</sup> An enforcement action may be a Direction issued by HSE under the nuclear site licence, an Improvement Notice, or a Prohibition Notice, or the laying of information in pursuit of a prosecution.

**TABLE 2**

**APPROVALS, CONSENTS, DIRECTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS  
ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER**

**1 JANUARY TO 31 MARCH 2005**

Date	Type	Ref. No.	Description
<b>BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A</b>			
<b>BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G</b>			
03/03/06	Consent	568	Consent to operate Solvent Treatment Plant
13/03/06	Approval	575	Approval of parts of the arrangements for the periodic and systematic review and reassessment of safety cases
<b>BNGSL Windscale – Nuclear Site Licence no. 46B</b>			

**TABLE 3****LICENCE INSTRUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER****1 JANUARY TO 31 MARCH 2005**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Ref. No.</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A</b>			
<b>BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G</b>			
13/01/06	<b>Agreement</b>	561	HAST Peripheral jet ballast direct air operation
02/02/06	<b>Acknowledgement</b>	563	Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation: SMP consent to operate safety case implementation - implementation pmp
09/01/06	<b>Notification</b>	566	notification to submit a safety case and not commence operation of the relevant process without the consent of the executive
08/02/06	<b>Specification</b>	567	Specification to submit to the executive for approval parts of the arrangements for the periodic & systematic review
16/02/06	<b>Specification</b>	569	Specification to submit to the executive for approval parts of the arrangements for the periodic and systematic review and reassessment of safety cases
02/03/06	<b>Agreement</b>	570	Agreement to commence installation of plant and equipment for the Sellafield product and residue store (sprs)
16/03/06	<b>Agreement</b>	574	Agreement to Thorp cell 220 low pressure cooling water system modifications
09/03/06	<b>Acknowledgement</b>	576	Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for: plant modification proposal B30/184/05 revision 0 implementation of the continued operation safety case for the baseline control and surveillance separations and the implementation of the live safety case summary issue 5
16/03/06	<b>Acknowledgement</b>	577	Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for: implementation of tank 3 ma tank farm continued operations safety case and ma tank farm care &

			maintenance safety case
28/03/06	<b>Acknowledgement</b>	582	Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for phase 3 active commissioning for waste treatment complex (WTC)
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