



HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE
BNGSL SELLAFIELD AND DRIGG, AND UKAEA WINDSCALE
WEST CUMBRIA SITES STAKEHOLDER GROUP
QUARTERLY REPORT FOR 1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2005

FOREWORD

This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above sites available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at BNGSL Sellafield and Drigg, and UKAEA Windscale.

These reports are distributed quarterly and will be available on the Internet. Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) attend WCSSG meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact HSE, Nuclear Safety Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.

This report will be put onto the HSE Website at

[http:// www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/lc/index.htm](http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/lc/index.htm) under "Local Liaison Committee Reports"

1 INTRODUCTION

NII Inspectors made a total of 66 visits to the Sellafield, Calder Hall, Windscale and Drigg sites during the quarter. This involved a total of 274 days on site (see Table 1 for details). The more significant issues identified during these inspections are summarised below.

2 BNGSL SELLAFIELD

2.1 GENERAL SITE MATTERS

A number of events have occurred associated with THORP, Magnox Product Finishing Line and Storage, and High Level Waste Plants that have raised concerns within NII on safety management and culture on the Sellafield site. BNGSL had initially responded separately to these issues but has recognised the benefits of integrating and implementing any improvement initiatives across the site. This has resulted in BNGSL developing an Integrated Site Improvement Plan, which is supported by HSE/NII in principle although the details have still to be presented.

HSE/NII is establishing a team comprising inspectors, not only from NII but also other HSE Directorates and the Environment Agency, to consider a range of issues including BNGSL's response to recent events on the site, safety culture/management issues and the influence of the corporate centre on safety. The detailed Aims and Objectives of this Team have still to be finalised which suggests that the Team is unlikely to have completed its work until early in the next planning year.

2.1.1 Team Inspections

Alarm Management inspections on a total of six plants were made during August and September. A team of three NII inspectors, led by a specialist inspector carried out the inspections. The licensee was found to be making broadly acceptable progress with improving alarm management at the plant control rooms, in accordance with developing site arrangements, but further work remains to be done, particularly on high hazard plants. NII will continue to apply resource to inspect this topic.

A team of three NII inspectors inspected progress against the "shield door improvements" project, (the subject of an earlier Specification from NII, requiring annual reports, until completion, to the licensee's Nuclear Safety Committee). The licensee reported acceptable progress with ongoing improvements across the BNGSL site. NII plans further inspections as the work nears completion.

2.2 INCIDENTS

2.2.1 Floc Storage Facility – Floc Retrievals

BNGSL successfully processed the 7th batch of sludge from the Floc Storage Facility at the start of this reporting period. However, floc retrieval operations have been suspended since mid July because of problems with part of the engineered pumped recirculation system, called "spillbacks", in the Buffer Storage Tank that maintains the

floc in suspension. Leaks have developed on the rotating bearings of the three “spillbacks”, which have led to liquor accumulating in the sumps of the secondary containment. NII was made aware of this in early September and has indicated its concern to BNGSL at the delay in notification. There was also a delay of 4 weeks in raising an Incident Event Report (IER) under BNGSL’s own arrangements.

NII, in conjunction with the EA, has followed up the event regarding the leakage from primary containment and the need for BNGSL to suspend floc retrieval operations. There is clear evidence of bearing seal failure on each of the “spillbacks” in the Buffer Storage Tank. BNGSL has been asked to supply a number of documents (timeline of the event as it developed, shift logs, instrument readings etc.) to help the NII and EA establish the facts of the event. BNGSL continues to develop a solution to the problem but both NII and EA have been assured that the engineering solution will not be implemented until the root cause of the failure has been established. The NII’s investigations are continuing.

2.2.2 Aerial Discharge, High Level Liquid Waste Plants

There was an activity release from the Highly Active Liquor Evaporation & Storage plant at Sellafield via the cell extract ventilation system on the 25 August 2005. Current indications are that the release occurred over a roughly one-hour period in late morning and around 1000MBq of activity was released.

Whilst the radiological consequences of the incident appear to be small, NII is concerned because it represents an apparent loss of control over the Highly Active Liquor (HAL). NII is closely monitoring BNGSL’s actions in recovering the situation and in determining the causes. NII has started a joint investigation into this event with the Environment Agency.

The levels were only just above the normal background radiation levels and did not exceed any statutory limits. The discharge was just detectable by the Site Perimeter Monitoring System.

2.2.3 Sea Line

During routine pressure testing a second hole was identified in the Sea Line 3 below but close to the low water mark (the previous one was reported in June). Discharges were again transferred to the Reserve Sea Line. The Environment Agency is the lead regulator and monitored BNGSL’s response to this event. Reassurance monitoring of the beach and surrounding area confirmed that there was no contamination on shore. The hole was repaired and the normal discharge route re-established. A programme for a permanent repair is being produced.

2.2.4 Product Storage Facility

The NII still awaits the results of BNGSL’s investigation into the inadvertent dismantling of a section of wall in a Product Store Facility during seismic strengthening work undertaken by contractors, briefly mentioned in the NII’s previous report.

2.2.5 Cs 137 Discharge, Vitrification Plants

In late April 2005, Vitrification Line 1 was being restarted following a period of

maintenance work to replace equipment. As part of the restart, technicians were calibrating pressure gauges linked to an item that had been replaced. This procedure temporarily increased the pressure in the associated equipment and caused a very small release of radioactivity into an adjacent area within the plant. All procedures were correctly followed and plant conditions were quickly returned to normal. BNGSL carried out a full investigation and a number of improvements to operating procedures were made as a result. NII monitored BNGSL's response and its actions to address their recommendations.

As a consequence of this event in April, routine analysis from aerial discharge accountancy samples from the Vitrification Plant discharge stack showed, in late June, an unexpectedly high level of Caesium 137. These samples have been subject to further detailed analysis and have indicated that the rolling twelve month authorised discharge limit for Caesium 137 for this particular stack has been exceeded by fifteen percent. No other isotopic limits were exceeded and the Caesium 137 limit for this particular stack represents about 2 percent of the overall site-wide limit for Caesium 137. Any further action is a matter for the Environment Agency.

BNGSL has reported the event as a Level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale and as an event that is reportable to Ministers.

2.3 MAGNOX REPROCESSING OPERATIONS

2.3.1 Reprocessing Operations

The reprocessing plant periodic shutdown commenced on 1 April 2005. Due to delays in starting up Product Finishing and Storage Plants, the shutdown has been extended beyond the period originally programmed. Before the plant can be restarted a Consent to Operate will have to be issued by NII.

2.3.2 Fuel Handling Plant (FHP) and Pond Conditions

Fuel decanning operations continue to be halted in the Fuel Handling Plant due to the reprocessing plant periodic shutdown. The pond water radioactivity contamination level has continued to reduce and is in the 2000 to 2500 Bq/ml range.

2.3.3 Magnox Product Finishing and Storage Facility (Magnox PF&S)

The Magnox PF&S facility remains shutdown as a result of the previously reported Direction issued under LC31 (1) to halt feed to the conditioning vessels of Finishing Line 5.

BNGSL has undertaken a significant amount of work to address the NII's concerns related to the original Direction to halt feeds to the Finishing Line. BNGSL submitted the Phase 1 Periodic Safety Review (PSR) on its declared date of 30th June 2005. This document was considered essential in restoring the NII's confidence in the ability of the facility to continue operating safely. However, the NII judged that it was incomplete when submitted. A reconciliation exercise was subsequently undertaken by BNGSL to address the Phase 1 PSR shortfalls.

NII specialist inspectors have assessed BNGSL's submission over the last few months and have raised various issues with the Licensee. A number are concerned with the

fact that the documents submitted indicate that under the fully Developed Safety Case (fdSC) format, the current arrangements for the inadvertent accumulation of fissile liquors and powders in gloveboxes are not acceptable.

A team of 6 of the NII's Inspectors also undertook a readiness inspection of the facility during August. Subsequently, NII identified the issues arising from NII's assessment of the PSR and the readiness inspection that needed to be addressed by BNGSL as a prerequisite to restart.

During this period BNGSL addressed the prerequisites and issues that were necessary before any application for consent to restart would be considered by NII. NII attended a restart meeting with the Licensee on the 21st September 2005. The meeting agreed that BNGSL still had issues that it needed to closeout prior to requesting a Consent to restart. The main one related to the adequacy of the safeguards against inadvertent accumulations of fissile material. It was expected that the issues will be reconciled such that Consent to restart could be considered early in October.

NII will continue to take cognisance of the impact that a protracted delay in the restart of the Finishing Line will have across the Sellafield site in terms of increased nuclear/radiological risk in other plant areas, delivery of the Magnox Operating Plan (MoP), and potential wider effects on the nuclear power industry.

Note – During the preparation of this report the NII issued BNGSL with Consent under LC31 (2) to restart feeds to the conditioning vessels of Finishing Line 5 at Sellafield on the 10th October 2005. A more detailed brief will be provided in the final Quarterly report for 2005.

2.4 THORP OPERATIONS

2.4.1 Thorp Operations

NII was made aware on the 20th April 2005 of the discovery of some 83m³ of leaked product dissolver liquor within the THORP Feed Clarification Cell. There has been significant worldwide interest into this event and requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act. The incident has been rated as INES 3. The leaked liquor has been safely recovered back into primary containment.

NII's investigations are ongoing but are likely to conclude soon. Information is being formally collected. To date, two Improvement Notices have been issued, linked to Licence Conditions 24/25 (instructions and recording) and 28/34 (maintenance and leak detection).

One group of inspectors is undertaking an investigation at Sellafield into the event and why the leak remained unrevealed for some time. A further team is investigating the technical reasons for the pipe failure and is liaising with the licensee on their options for plant configuration and return to service. It is too soon to say what the outcome of the investigations will be and whether any further regulatory action is warranted.

Thorp is currently shut down. Consideration of return to service will be dependent on submission of appropriate modification proposal(s).

2.5 HIGH ACTIVE LIQUOR WASTE PLANTS

2.5.1 High Active Storage Tanks (HAST)

The results of monitoring of the activity in the cooling water of the HAST tanks continue to be reported by BNGSL under the agreed process. Engineering modifications to HAST13 to protect workers and the public in the event that activity above trigger levels is detected in the coolant have been completed. This should allow continued limited use of the HAST in the near term but the condition of the HAST and integrity of its jackets will continue to be monitored.

2.5.3 HAL Operations

Engineering modifications to Evaporator A and a review of the safety case were completed during the period and NII issued a Licence Instrument in September to allow operation for a twelve-month period. A review of the safety case and consideration of further reasonably practicable improvements to safety will be needed for continued operation beyond this twelve month period. BNGSL continues to develop and deploy inspection techniques on the heating/cooling components of all three evaporators to inform predictions of evaporator lifetime. Evaporator A will now be used to support Magnox reprocessing.

2.5.4 Cooling Integrity

NII has allowed the initial stage of the intermediate heat exchangers project to go ahead. This involves pipework modifications and the installation of new activity monitoring systems on the basal jackets of HASTs, together with other modifications that improve safety in the shorter term. The installation of the intermediate heat exchangers themselves is still some way off.

2.5.5 Windscale Vitrification Plant (WVP)

The performance of the Vitrification Plant was affected by a number of factors including planned rebuilds and a number of operational difficulties, such as the need to replace a pipe on the glass frit feed system during this period. Melter performance has continued to improve and, if this is maintained, will reduce the number of rebuilds required in future and contribute to increased output.

2.5.6 Residue Export Facility

The project is progressing ahead of schedule. Efforts continue to be made by BNGSL to learn from a number of minor conventional safety incidents and to improve safety awareness.

2.6 MOX OPERATIONS

2.6.1 Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) Commissioning and Operation

SMP continued MOX commissioning operations along the full line, whilst continuing to manufacture the next 12 fuel assemblies. Safety performance has generally been good. Plant inspection was limited due to NII priorities elsewhere on site, though close contact has been maintained with plant management.

Sufficient commissioning has been completed during the manufacture of the first 4 fuel assemblies to provide adequate information to complete the review of the safety case, in preparation for its submission in support of the forthcoming request for Consent to Operate (CTO). The application by BNGSL was to be made mid November 2005, but some delays have been experienced in finalizing the work on the engineering substantiation, which will delay the CTO submission date towards the end of the financial year. This will have no impact on plant operations or manufacturing programmes, as the plant will continue in the MOX commissioning phase, gaining further operating experience, until CTO is granted by HSE/NII. NII is content with this position and is monitoring delivery of the work in support of the CTO safety case, in close liaison with the Environment Agency.

In the meantime, several 'readiness for Consent to Operate' inspections are planned, to cover a range of topics. For example, an NII 'Management of Safety' Inspection is planned for October 2005 and a joint Inspection by the NII and Environment Agency Inspectors in November.

2.7 WASTE TREATMENT & DECOMMISSIONING

2.7.1 Contaminated Land / Groundwater

During the second quarter of 2005 NII initiated a process to require BNGSL to come forward with a more cogent and comprehensive plan of work in this area, in preparation for a consultation meeting under the licence conditions. BNGSL established a project board to manage the preparation of material for the consultation process. The meeting has been arranged for 18th October 2005, and preliminary information has been provided by BNGSL at the end of September 2005 in preparation for the meeting.

The issues to be covered partly relate to long-term concerns, such as the site end states, but also to the day-to-day management of historical disposals and leaks. The monitoring of these disposals and leaks, and the underpinning scientific modelling to allow sensible decision making are also factors that need to be considered.

2.7.2 Waste Treatment Complex (WTC)

BNGSL is expected to request the move to Phase 3 commissioning during the next period; there has been some delay to allow a number of residual issues to be resolved. If Phase 3 commissioning goes well, BNGSL will submit a request for WTC to move to full operations in early 2006.

2.7.3 Engineered Drum Store 3

This new drum store has completed construction and is nearing completion of inactive commissioning. It is expected to shortly be handed over to operations management control, which will make a request to move to active commissioning.

2.7.4 Decommissioning and Demolition

The next phase of decommissioning has started in the PFR Fuel Line.

Demolition work has started on one facility, the Reprocessing Store. This is the lead demolition project for the main part of the Sellafield site. It marks the start of an increasing amount of demolition work on site; the next demolition project is expected to be the Uranium Purification Plant, where final clear-out and preparation work is currently under way.

2.8 LEGACY PONDS & SILOS

2.8.1 Legacy Silos

Funding issues described in previous WCSSG reports appear to be resolved. Change Control Requests have been made for work that otherwise would be delayed and have been agreed by internal processes and by NDA. BNGSL has attempted to reduce the impact of funding uncertainty and now has funds allowing safety improvements to the Silos to be implemented during the remainder of the financial year.

The programme of improvements associated with the Wet Silos included the installation of a new crane within the building. This replaced a redundant crane and will be used to install retrievals plant and move flasks during silo emptying. BNGSL carried out the work with due regard to safety but there were minor learning points for BNGSL from the project. These will be captured and used to inform future project work either on this facility or elsewhere on site.

Retrievals projects for the Wet Silos are reaching critical milestones and important decisions are required on the retrieval process to be adopted, the waste treatment process to be adopted, the form and type of the product, and an appropriate waste store. BNGSL is working to ensure that the treatment plant availability (or storage availability) does not affect the start of retrievals.

Following the periodic review of the safety case for the Dry Silos, the facility has been preparing to implement a revised Baseline Safety Case. This was fully implemented on 30th September 2005. Work continues on a project to provide an additional (seismically qualified) argon supply for inerting and fire suppression.

The Dry Silos Project Team is developing concepts for retrievals machines and support facilities that build upon site experience but also take into account experience from elsewhere. Progress needs to be maintained to ensure that project funding is not threatened. As with the Wet Silos Project, discussions need to continue on the choice of product and, treatment and storage options for the wastes.

2.8.2 Piles Fuels Storage Pond and Magnox Storage Pond

BNGSL continues to make progress on the enabling tasks towards retrievals from the Magnox Storage Pond. Of particular note is the project to retrieve a skip of fuel for characterisation purposes to determine if the fuel can be reprocessed or alternative means of dealing with it need to be established. This retrieval activity is expected to go ahead in the near future.

BNGSL has obtained good information following a Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) survey of the Magnox Storage pond. Analysis of the data, including pictures and radiological measurements, has enabled BNGSL to begin developing a tactical pond management plan.

The movement of skips of fuel from the Piles Storage Pond is being prevented by the continued unavailability of B13. BNGSL has started developing plans to move skips within the pond that will create space for future operations.

2.9 SITE & PLANT SERVICES, INCLUDING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

2.9.1 Site Services

A meeting was held with the EA and BNGSL to discuss the future of the Calder Landfill Extension Segregated Area (CLESA). This Facility had been originally constructed for the disposal of putrescent waste, but EA has indicated that there may be problems with the intended use of the site. NII has indicated that the current arrangements for the accumulation of this very low-level waste requires improving and EA and NII are to write to BNGSL setting out their respective positions.

2.9.2 BNFL Technology Centre (BTC)

BNGSL has indicated that there could be a delay of up to 12 months in the active commissioning programme for BTC caused by the need to re-assess the funding required to complete the work.

As a consequence, Nexia Solutions Ltd, the operator of these laboratories has assessed whether or not safety case and engineering substantiation work needs to be carried out for continued operations in the existing facilities. A robust justification will be required, also taking into account ALARP issues and financial matters, if work currently carried out in other buildings, is not transferred to the original timescales.

The latest summary and detailed programmes were reviewed, and each of commissioning phases 1, 2, and 3 were discussed. Phase 1 active commissioning is to continue following repairs to the building structure, and Phase 2 active commissioning is due to start in March 2006. The active commissioning programme for Phase 3 is due to commence in December and includes trials using sealed sources to test the shielding of the facilities. An outline method of working was agreed with the detail to be discussed at the next meeting.

2.9.3 Analytical Services

A review of the documentation for the LC36 Management of Change "Major +" proposal for the transfer of Geoffrey Schofield Labs (GSL) from BNGSL to BIL Solutions Ltd. was carried out in early July. It was found that the documentation was complete, and that there was evidence that the prerequisite actions had been carried out. NII issued a License Instrument for agreement to the GSL transfer.

2.9.4 Utilities

The recent Sealine Pipebridge Refurbishment Project contamination events were discussed with the Head of Utilities. Several small areas of low-level contamination were found on the beach outside the Site boundary in an area where compounds were being set up for the refurbishment work. The area has been fenced off from public access for over 12 months. Analysis of the activity has confirmed that the contamination is old and hence not from any recent leakage. A programme of increased surveying and removal of contamination from the area has been initiated. The Environment Agency is the lead regulator on the Sealine Pipebridge Refurbishment Project.

2.10 EFFLUENT & ENCAPSULATION

2.10.1 MEP

BNGSL has received a Nirex Letter of Comfort that will enable an increase in metals content of the encapsulated waste form as a result of processing floc from the Floc Storage Facility through EARP and WPEP. This will result in a considerable reduction in the number of ILW drums generated from this waste stream over the next few years.

2.10.2 ILW

BNGSL continues to work on providing a robust business case for a new Encapsulated Product Store.

3 CALDER HALL

3.1 ROUTINE MATTERS

3.1.1 Asbestos Removal Project

The HSE has continued to maintain regulatory interest in the removal of asbestos from the boilers. As the boilers are external, the asbestos is exposed to the elements and following the ending of power operation, there is a need to remove the asbestos insulation before there is excessive degradation. Work with asbestos is an activity licensed by the HSE, and NII's colleagues in Field Operations Directorate (FOD) located at HSE's Preston office have led on this aspect of the project. In addition to routine visits and planned inspections, FOD has carried out an unannounced inspection. The HSE has been satisfied that the removal work has been carried out safely and will continue to take an interest in this large asbestos removal project.

3.2 NON – ROUTINE MATTERS

3.2.1 Enhanced Inspection

In 2003, the NII gave its agreement both to a Post Operational Safety Case (POSC) and to the transfer of the operational responsibility of Calder Hall from Magnox Electric (then known as Magnox Generation Business Group) where it was grouped with the other operating Magnox reactor sites, into Sellafield's Magnox Reprocessing Division. Since then BNGSL transferred Calder Hall into the Clean Up and Decommissioning Directorate. This led to some concerns, and the NII carried out an enhanced inspection to ensure that there had been no deterioration in Calder Hall's capability to continue to meet the requirements of its POSC as a result of organisation and staffing changes.

Although satisfied that the current position is still secure, the NII concluded that steps needed to be taken to continue to preserve this position and remove uncertainties. For project purposes Calder Hall is still considered to be an operating reactor site while the fuel is still in the reactors. The NII expects it to have an organisation structure,

culture and staffing that has taken into account the experience and standards from other Magnox reactors in a similar post generation phase. This should provide confidence both that defuelling will be achieved safely and that it will meet the overall UK plan for the end of life of the Magnox reactor fleet. A letter has been sent to BNGSL identifying NII's findings following this inspection.

4 UKAEA WINDSCALE

4.1 B13

4.1.1 Improvement Notices

On 12th April UKAEA Windscale reported that British Nuclear Group Sellafield Ltd had found a package in the Magnox Reprocessing Plant Southern Compound that was emitting unusually high levels of radiation. The package had been shipped from B13, Windscale. Early information indicated that the B13 monitoring procedures should not have allowed this package to leave. There was no risk to the public from this event.

NII has completed formal investigation into the event. The key conclusions were: -

- The document system in B13 is complicated, places too much reliance on generic documents and does not clearly pick out the essential requirements needed on a day-to-day basis to ensure safe working.
- The level of supervision in the facility by both UKAEA and Nexia Solutions Ltd was not adequate to ensure compliance with the written instructions.

Use of the HSE Enforcement Management Model, following the investigation, concluded that Improvement Notices were the appropriate enforcement method. Two notices have been issued, one to UKAEA as holder of the Windscale Nuclear Site Licence under Licence Conditions 24 and 26, and one to Nexia Solutions Ltd, as the tenant in B13, under Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, Regulations 3,5, and 11.

4.1.2 Operational Safety Case

NII reported last quarter that it is concerned at the range of weaknesses that are in the B13 operational safety case. NII had therefore issued a Specification under Licence Condition 13, Licence Instrument 512, that requires UKAEA to seek advice from its Southern Nuclear Safety Committee on

- The adequacy of UKAEA's procedures for the production and assessment of safety cases, and
- The adequacy of the endorsement of the Safety Report that describes the B13 safety case taking into account the range and importance of the issues raised by NII.

The Nuclear Safety Committee has met twice to consider this specification, in August and September, and is expected to conclude its deliberations at the meeting in early

November. In addition to the concerns raised by NII, the committee is concerned that work planning is poor, and has requested that they be given a resourced plan, in time for the November meeting, for all of the work streams in B13.

4.2 Pile 1

UKAEA has delivered a new Operational Safety Case to NII for Pile 1. NII will be assessing the detail of this case, which presents a lot of new information relating to criticality, and fire ignition and propagation. The new detail is likely to have implications for the decommissioning safety case.

4.3 Safety Cases

UKAEA continued to have problems resourcing safety cases at Windscale. The current Operational Safety Case for B14 was prepared in 1995, and had its validity extended in 2001 to December 2003. This was extended a second time at the end of 2003 for a further two years. The replacement safety case that will lead to decommissioning of the facility is now not expected to be ready by the end of December; NII has requested that a separate document justifying continuing safety related care and maintenance for B14 be prepared.

4.4 Emergency Exercises

There have been no observed exercises at Windscale this quarter.

4.5 Life Cycle Baseline/Near Term Work Plan (LCBL/NTWP)

UKAEA delivered the next Life Cycle Baseline to NDA on 30th September, with a copy for NII. NII and EA together have continued to have regular contact with the Windscale programme office, through the site regulator forum, as they developed their third life-cycle baseline.

NII has not yet assessed the detail in the document submitted on 30th September, but two items do stand out; the continuing lack of detail for B13, and the deferral of final decommissioning of the two Piles Reactors.

5 LLWR at Drigg

BNGSL has submitted a programme for completion and delivery of the Over-arching Site Safety Report.

Stakeholder meetings have been held between BNGSL, regulators (NII, EA, Local Authorities) and the NDA to discuss BNGSL's options for continuity of LLW operations in the event that vault 9 is not available when vault 8 is full. Subsequently BNGSL has submitted a planning application for temporary storage of LLW Iso-containers in vault 8. The application proposes to stack the Iso-containers 6 high, as opposed to 4 high, on a temporary basis. This temporary storage will be subject to regulation by NII under the Nuclear Site licence.

HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE

TABLE 1

**QUARTERLY RETURNS FOR
SELLAFIELD, CALDER HALL, DRIGG AND WINDSCALE**

DURING THE QUARTER

1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2005

| | BNGSL SELLAFIELD ¹ | BNGSL CALDER HALL ² | BNGSL DRIGG | UKAEA WINDSCALE |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| NUMBER OF VISITS | 50 | 9 | 1 | 6 |
| INSPECTION DAYS ON SITE | 236 | 13.5 | 4 | 20.5 |
| ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ³ | - | - | - | 1 |
| Incidents in the quarter likely to be published in HSE's quarterly "Statement of Nuclear Incidents at Nuclear Installations" | - | - | - | - |
| CONSENTS, APPROVALS | - | - | - | - |
| LICENCE INSTRUMENTS | 11 | - | - | - |

¹ The figures shown for BNGSL Sellafield are those for BNGSL's chemical plants. They do not include figures for the plants within the Electricity Generation Group (see note 2 below)

² The figures shown for BNGSL Calder Hall are those for the plants on the Sellafield site operated by (or for) the Electricity Generation group, primarily Calder Hall nuclear power plant.

³ An enforcement action may be a Direction issued by HSE under the nuclear site licence, an Improvement Notice, or a Prohibition Notice, or the laying of information in pursuit of a prosecution.

TABLE 2

**APPROVALS, CONSENTS, DIRECTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS
ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER**

1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2005

| Date | Type | Ref. No. | Description |
|---|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A | | | |
| | | | |
| BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| UKAEA Windscale – Nuclear Site Licence no. 46B | | | |
| 23/8/05 | Improvement Notice | 001 | Improvement Notice I/2005/NSD/AJW/001 |
| | | | |
| | | | |

TABLE 3**LICENCE INSTRUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER****1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 2005**

| Date | Type | Ref. No. | Description |
|---|------------------------|-----------------|--|
| BNGSL DRIGG Nuclear Site Licence no. 29A | | | |
| | | | |
| BNGSL Sellafield (and Calder Works) – Nuclear Site Licence no. 31G | | | |
| 13/7/05 | Agreement | 542 | Project report in support of an agreement for the transfer of Geoffrey Schofield Laboratories to BIL Solutions LTD |
| 26/7/05 | Acknowledgement | 543 | Acknowledgement of receipt safety documentation for setting to work of VPS Compartments 3 and 4 |
| 9/8/05 | Acknowledgement | 544 | Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation relevant to B277 phase 3B stage 2A Decommissioning - Active Commissioning and Operations Tasks |
| 10/8/05 | Acknowledgement | 545 | Acknowledgement of B38 review point definition document |
| 10/8/05 | Acknowledgement | 546 | Acknowledgement of Safety Documentation modification to Safety Case |
| 15/8/05 | Acknowledgement | 547 | Acknowledgement of safety documentation for the implementation of the fuel handling plant B311 and b350 safety cases |
| 15/8/05 | Acknowledgement | 548 | Acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for the B30 fuel retrieval trial |
| 8/9/05 | Agreement | 550 | B215 Implementation of revised evaporator A safety case |
| 16/9/05 | Agreement | 551 | Agreement to implement plant modification proposal for installation, commissioning and operation of the new B38 55TE West End crane made under Licence Condition 22(1) |
| 29/9/05 | Acknowledgement | 552 | Acknowledgement of Receipt of Safety Documentation B383/B384 COSC Implementation PMP |
| 29/9/05 | Acknowledgement | 553 | Request for acknowledgement of receipt of safety documentation for the B30 redundant effluent sludge pipework systems (resps) as described under a plant modification proposal |
| UKAEA WINDSCALE – Nuclear Site Licence no. 46B | | | |
| | | | |

