

HM NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS INSPECTORATE

**BNFL SELLAFIELD AND DRIGG AND UKAEA WINDSCALE LOCAL LIAISON
COMMITTEE REPORT**

QUARTERLY REPORT FOR 1 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 2000

FOREWORD

This report is issued as part of the Health and Safety Executive's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above sites available to the public. It is for distribution to members of the Sellafield Local Liaison Committee (LLC) and covers activities associated with the regulation of safety at BNFL Sellafield and Drigg and UKAEA Windscale.

These reports are distributed quarterly and will be available on the Internet. (They can be found at <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nsd/nsdhome.htm>). Site Inspectors of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) attend LLC meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact HSE, Nuclear Safety Directorate Information Centre on 0151 951 4103.

1 INSPECTIONS

Inspectors from HMNII made a total of 64 visits to the Sellafield, Calder Hall, Windscale and Drigg sites during the quarter. This involved a total of 212 inspector days on site (see table 1 for details).

Visit of Chairman of Health and Safety Commission

The Chairman of the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) made a familiarisation visit to the Sellafield site and was accompanied by the NII Chief Inspector and the Nominated Site Inspector. The Chairman met a number of TU safety representatives and senior site managers as well as visiting the B30, B38, B215, B241, WVP and SMP facilities.

Visit with BNFL Chief Executive

The new Chief Executive accepted an invitation to spend a day visiting plants with a number of the NII inspectors. Visits to the B30, B38, B41, B241, WTC, EDS and B300 series stores were made. Our comments on these facilities and the company's plans were given to Mr Askew in the presence of the local management. Mr Askew said that he found the day valuable and asked for a similar visit to be organised later in the year.

Meeting with Safety Representatives

A number of the safety representatives met with the NII site inspection team to discuss ways of working together to improve safety performance at Sellafield. This day long meeting took place off site and views on a number of topical issues were exchanged. This included the rationale and broad content of the NII Site Inspection Programme and the management of the actions from the various NII reports. The roles and responsibilities of both NII Inspectors and Safety Representatives were considered and it was agreed that some joint inspections would be undertaken as part of our Site Inspection Programme.

2 ROUTINE MATTERS

2.1 SITE INSPECTION PROGRAMME

Site Inspection Programmes (SIP) for the BNFL Sellafield, Drigg and UKAEA sites have been prepared for the planning year 2000/1. These programmes include a series of compliance inspections to ensure that the licensee is complying with the relevant statutory provisions; this is termed as the Basic Inspection Programme (BIP). The BIP aims to provide broad inspection coverage of all activities undertaken on the site and ensures that more inspections take place on plants which pose the highest risk.

For the "chemical plants area" of the BNFL Sellafield site the SIP includes a series of planned assessments of the licensee's arrangements for managing safety on the site. These will be used to form the basis for the assessment of safety performance from the BIP as well identifying where we judge the arrangements need to be improved. It should be noted that some of these assessments have already been completed, for instance as part of "Control and Supervision" inspection carried out last year, but this is not the case for all areas. The SIP also includes a number of targeted inspections to support the BIP or provide verification that BNFL's claimed improvements have been implemented.

The development of an effective safety culture is a vital element in the achievement of high standards of safety. An assessment of the safety culture on the Sellafield site will be undertaken as part of the inspection programme using a tool developed for HSE, based on a modified form of the European Quality Foundation "Business Excellence Model". The initial assessment has started and has included a survey of the views of NII inspectors, safety representatives and senior management. The initial assessment will be completed during the next couple of months and will form the basis for future assessments.

Key activities from the Site Inspection Programme, including commentary on BNFL's progress at implementing the actions from the recent reports, are summarised in this section.

Compliance Inspections

Following a re-inspection of licence condition 8 (Warning Notices) it was identified that BNFL has not fully met its commitments following the findings of an earlier inspection in July 1999. Consideration is being given to regulatory action to ensure that the outstanding programme of work is implemented within a suitable time frame. [An Improvement Notice was issued on 10 July 2000]

Emergency Exercises and Arrangements

The Emergency Plan for BNFL Sellafield and Drigg sites and the equivalent document for the UKAEA Windscale site was approved under the arrangements for licence condition 11. UKAEA and BNFL carried out a joint demonstration of the amended emergency plan and arrangements on 27 June which was observed by a team of NII inspectors. UKAEA and BNFL successfully demonstrated that they could effectively run the Sellafield Emergency Control Centre for a UKAEA site event whilst recognising and reflecting UKAEA's responsibility for control of events on its site. The exercise also provided confirmation that there is at least one viable Emergency Reception Centre (ERC) on the site. As there is a programme to test and upgrade other ERCs as necessary this is regarded as a significant improvement.

The exercise identified that there were some problems with access control arrangements at the incident plant (Pile 1). UKAEA has been required to make improvements and to carry out a repeat exercise to demonstrate that these have been achieved. Continuing problems with the BNFL arrangements for roll call and accounting for persons on the site together with the welfare provisions for personnel requiring to shelter were also identified. The areas requiring improvement have been communicated to the both BNFL and UKAEA and their actions to address them will be monitored.

2.2 TEAM INSPECTION OF OPERATIONS AT SELLAFIELD

Work to review and monitor BNFL's actions to respond to the "Team Inspection" report has been undertaken. As the company's response is still in the early stages of implementation no recommendations have yet been closed out by NII. However, BNFL considers that it has achieved all the declared "milestones" and NII has arrangements in place between NII and BNFL to routinely monitor progress. So as to ensure that there is no misunderstanding a protocol for agreeing close out of each recommendation has been agreed with the company. A summary of our work in this area is provided below.

Recommendation 1: A revised statement of the company's health and safety policy, signed by the new Chief Executive, has been received. This general policy is to be supported by a suite

of revised procedures and instructions detailing how the policy should be implemented at the workplace. BNFL has reported that the requirements of this recommendation have been achieved and NII is currently reviewing the submitted documents.

Recommendations 14-16: NII regards BNFL's programme to fully address these recommendations as optimistic. It is considered that while the new processes may be in place meaningful measurable outputs from some of them are unlikely to be available by the declared implementation date.

Recommendation 23: A series of meetings have been held to advise BNFL on the scope of the work required to fully address the requirements of this recommendation. It was made clear that this includes the labelling of plant, providing access to plant drawings and securing configuration control of key plant items as well as the matters already included in BNFL's plans.

2.3 FALSIFICATION OF DATA IN THE MOX DEMONSTRATION FACILITY

BNFL believe that recommendations from our report on pellet diameter data falsification will be completed by end July 2000. NII has informed BNFL that prior to it considering agreement to restart the plant it will be necessary for BNFL to "re-commission" the plant together with the personnel operating it. This will require BNFL to demonstrate that all activities within the plant are in compliance with the relevant site licence conditions and that an appropriate monitoring and audit regime is in place.

2.4 HIGHLY ACTIVE LIQUOR STRATEGY REPORT

Following the publication of this report on 18 February 2000 a number of discussions with BNFL have taken place. The objectives of these discussions have been to agree an appropriate "buffer stock" of high level liquid waste, to which the storage tanks are expected to be emptied by around 2015, and the "stock reduction curves." BNFL is expected to provide all the relevant information by 18 August 2000. NII intends to use appropriate regulatory powers to secure the agreed "stock reduction curves" by the end of 2000. Details of the agreed "stock reduction curves" will be published in due course.

2.5 CONTINUED OPERATIONS SAFETY REPORTS (COSR)

BNFL has submitted COSRs in line with an agreed programme to justify the continued operation of facilities on the site. NII is not examining all of these safety reports, but a representative sample is being assessed. The sampling approach is being adopted as NII does not have sufficient resources to assess the adequacy of all COSRs, nor is it considered necessary as this is primarily the responsibility of BNFL. A summary of the status of our assessment of COSRs will be featured in future reports.

3 NON-ROUTINE MATTERS

3.1 GENERAL SITE MATTERS

Site Inspection Teams

A number of changes to the site inspection team have taken place as result of development reviews within NII. Such changes are routine and are aimed at providing individuals with the opportunity to develop their careers as well ensuring that inspectors do not "go native".

The Nominated Site Inspector for the BNFL Sellafield and Drigg sites is now Howard Robinson. Peter Burrows has joined the team as the inspector responsible for the Services Group. John Lindsay, the current inspector for the UKAEA Windscale site, has taken up new duties on the BNFL Sellafield site. He will continue to cover the Windscale site until his replacement Peter Watson is in post on 1 August 2000.

Licence Administration - BNFL

As a response to NII's letter of May 1999 is awaited no progress has been made in the issue of a new licence to accommodate boundary changes between the BNFL and UKAEA sites.

An application for a Consent under licence condition 3 to lease part of the site to GEN II was not granted. The lease was not regarded as acceptable by the HSE solicitor, nor had BNFL followed its own systems for making the application.

Licence Administration - UKAEA

A Consent to allow UKAEA to lease office space in building B21 to BNFL has been granted by NII.

Work to assess the UKAEA Management Prospectus is nearing completion. This has been submitted to enable a change in the UKAEA licence to accommodate boundary changes (see above).

Control of Radioactive Materials

BNFL's progress on addressing the "control of wild life" issue was reviewed jointly by NII and EA inspectors. BNFL has been informed that both the Agency and NII are concerned with the poor progress to date and that a co-ordinated site response is required to ensure proper control of radioactive materials at source.

Concerns about the inadequate implementation of the action plan to address the external storage of contaminated radioactive materials were raised with BNFL. This action plan had been agreed in December 1999 following the satisfactory closure of Improvement Notice I/1999/NSD/FAB2 issued 1 July 1999. BNFL has been informed that unless the action plan is substantially implemented within the agreed timescale we will issue a further Improvement Notice to formalise the matter.

Criticality Arrangements

An unannounced inspection of the B314 criticality emergency arrangements was performed during the evening of 5 April. This identified a number of matters of concern which NII required BNFL to take immediate action to remedy. This has been achieved, but regulatory action is being considered to ensure the longer term issues are resolved.

In the 1st quarter report for 2000 it was identified that NII had some concerns about the potential off-site effects of a criticality event on the site. BNFL's calculations of such an event, which confirm that radiation doses to personnel in dwellings near to the site would be below 5mSv, have been reviewed. NII has accepted the basis of these calculations and that there is no legal requirement to notify the residents of these dwellings of the potential hazard. However, the review has identified that amendments to the company's procedures to respond to off-site consequences of such an event are required. Furthermore, NII views that other measures, such as the creation of an earth bank to shield the dwellings from direct radiation exposure following a criticality, should be considered. BNFL is currently reviewing what measures they judge to be reasonably practicable to provide protection against this unlikely accident scenario.

Control of Modifications to Safety Related Software Systems

NII carried out a review of the BNFL Sellafield site's arrangements for controlling modifications to software on safety systems and safety related equipment and this identified that improvements were required. Guidance on how this could be achieved has been identified to the company. BNFL has been required to identify all "higher integrity computer-based systems" by 14 August 2000 and prohibit any modifications to them. The company has also been required to develop a programme by 11 September 2000 to address the issues identified by our inspection. The company's programme will be formalised by the issue of an Improvement Notice.

3.2 INCIDENTS

A number of incidents were investigated by inspectors during the quarter, the details of some are included below. In general these are events which have already been reported in the Sellafield Newsletters and some may be included in a future edition of the HSE Quarterly Statement of Incidents.

Damage to Windscale Vitrification Plant Manipulators

NII has continued to work alongside the UKAEA Constabulary in investigating this act of deliberate damage. Despite considerable effort by the company, trade unions, police and NII, it has not been possible to identify any individual as being responsible for this damage. BNFL has implemented a number of measures to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence.

Hydrogen Flare Off

On 12 May an uncontrolled ignition of gas occurred following maintenance on the hydrogen supply line to the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP). This resulted in BNFL suspending work in the area whilst the matter was investigated. An immediate investigation was not undertaken since this incident did not meet the reporting criteria under Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulations (RIDDOR) BNFL was asked to provide details of its investigation and this is currently being reviewed.

Fire in WAGR Primary Containment

On 17 June a fire occurred in the WAGR primary containment during decommissioning operations. The fire was extinguished by the site fire service, no radioactive materials were involved and there was no release into the environment. UKAEA is investigating the cause of the fire which was restricted to cable supplying a plasma arc cutting set and the supporting scaffold boards. An initial review of the incident has concluded that there is no need for immediate regulatory action. NII will review UKAEA's investigation report into the event when this has been received.

3.3 MAGNOX REPROCESSING OPERATIONS

Review of Magnox Reprocessing Operations

The annual review of safety within the Magnox Reprocessing group was held at Sellafield. BNFL presented its summary of performance over the past twelve months and a brief overview of its plans for the coming years. In general NII is content with the safety performance within the group, but has some reservations with capability of the plant to deliver the planned throughput. This is not an immediate safety concern, but throughput is an important factor in deciding plant life. As the company has now announced the closure dates for the Magnox reactors the predicted life of the reprocessing plants can now be properly assessed. This matter will be followed up by NII during the coming months.

Halt to Reprocessing Operations & Scheduled Shutdown

The B205 Magnox Reprocessing Plant shutdown on 16 June owing to the temporary halt of operations in one of the downstream plants. This in turn was due to the company imposed embargo on plutonium contaminated material (PCM) movement due to problems with the assay instrumentation. (This was identified in the report for the first quarter of 2000 and further information is included in section 4 of this report). BNFL is currently investigating alternative methods of PCM movement and storage to allow the restart of operations pending resumption of normal PCM handling operations. The re-commencement of PCM handling operations will be subject to examination by NII.

The scheduled shutdown of the Magnox reprocessing plants to allow essential maintenance to be undertaken is planned for September 2000. It is normal practice for NII to place a number of conditions to be satisfied before a consent to restart operations is granted. This has been discussed with BNFL and these conditions will be finalised before the commencement of the shutdown. The shutdown will present a significant workload to NII in both inspection activities and the regulation of key plant modifications. Accordingly, extra resources are being made available for this period.

3.4 THORP OPERATIONS, INCLUDING MOX PLANTS

The public consultation co-ordinated by the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) on the economic case for the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) officially ended on 23 July 1999. DETR is currently analysing the responses, but the date when a report is expected to be issued to Ministers is not currently known. Both BNFL and NII await the outcome of these deliberations, but in the meantime uranium safety commissioning of the plant continues. NII is

developing its inspection programme for confirming SMP's readiness to enter plutonium commissioning and for monitoring the commissioning process.

3.5 WASTE MANAGEMENT & EFFLUENT TREATMENT ACTIVITIES

Review of Waste Management Strategy and Plans

NII has been reviewing the status of radioactive waste management including commitments previously made by BNFL and, in particular, targets that have been reported in the public domain. BNFL is already moving towards such commitments and targets but NII wishes to ensure that the progress being made continues. NII sees a need to formalise some of the timescales for improving the status of ILW safety at Sellafield and will be taking measures to achieve this in the near future.

B215 Highly Active Storage

Assessment of the revised B215 safety case, which is in the new format of a Continued Operations Safety Report (COSR) supported by an underlying Continued Operations Safety Case (COSC), is nearing completion. There have been ongoing discussions regarding both technical issues and the implementation date of this COSR, which is expected to be 1st October 2000. BNFL has indicated that they may have some difficulty in achieving full implementation by this date. As the timescale for implementation was agreed with the company approximately 9 months ago NII has indicated that regulatory action will be taken if there are significant shortfalls.

Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP) "Trap Door " Event

NII is continuing to pursue two issues following its investigation of the event in November 1998 involving a type of shield door (known on the plant as a trap door). One issue focuses on improvements to the plant itself whilst the other covers the implications for shield doors across the site. NII's concern derives from the potential for a shield door failing to adequately protect a person from the hazard of a substantial exposure from a radiation source present on the other side of a door. NII is pressing for improvements to the control of isolation procedures, (e.g. controlling the isolation of motive power to doors) as well as upgrading doors site-wide, to achieve modern standards.

In the case of WVP a programme of actions to bring all shield doors in the plant up to BNFL's current standards has been prepared. This programme extends over eighteen months and NII has agreed with BNFL that the work will be prioritised to upgrade the highest safety significant shield doors first. The first shield door is expected to be upgraded within the next six months.

A programme to assess the conditions of the shield doors in other facilities on the site has commenced. It is understood that there are 17 facilities involved in this assessment and the programme extends until March 2002. BNFL's progress in this area is being closely monitored by NII.

Waste Vitrification Plant Breakdown Cells

Solid waste disposal from the breakdown cells still continues to be hampered by in-cell equipment failures. NII has expressed disappointment with this continuing poor performance. A number of photographs of the waste within the cells have been taken as a means of forming the "bench mark" for future improvement.

Waste Vitrification Plant Line 3

Inspections of several aspects of the inactive commissioning of the third vitrification line have been undertaken. The project remains on programme to enter active operations around the end of 2000.

New Ventilation Plant to B215 (Caustic Scrubber)

Further inspection and monitoring of progress on the commissioning of the new ventilation plant for the highly active waste storage tanks has been performed. The ventilation is being re-routed through a caustic scrubber to reduce aerial effluent discharges to the environment. Whilst the project does have some safety benefit the main improvement will be the reduced aerial discharge to the environment.

B211 Medium Active Liquor Storage Facilities

The projected lifetime for the storage tanks is an issue which is being discussed with BNFL. The COSR for the facility is expected in March 2001 and this will be subject to detailed assessment by NII.

Commissioning of Solvent Treatment Plant (STP)

Following an application by BNFL, an agreement to commence the active commissioning of the B803 Solvent Treatment Plant has been issued.

Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) Storage - Sellafield

During the preparation of the COSR for the B300 series stores BNFL identified a potential issue with respect to the structural integrity of the buildings in the event of an earthquake. Our preliminary assessment of the COSR has confirmed BNFL's identification of the issue and that it may be necessary to bring forward the dates to empty these stores of untreated PCM. BNFL has been asked to provide proposals for alternative storage arrangements as well as more details on its proposed enhancements to the stores.

Waste Treatment Complex (WTC)

BNFL is instigating a review of options for the operation of the crate breakdown facility due to continuing operability problems with the manipulators in the Waste Treatment Complex (WTC) which is currently under going inactive commissioning. WTC is a key facility to enable the proper treatment of PCM for long term storage on the site. NII is supportive of the approach being adopted by BNFL to ensure that a reliable and continually available plant is provided.

Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) Storage - Drigg

Retrievals from Drigg magazine 3 have stopped owing to a problem with the equipment required to assay the packages prior to transportation (see report for quarter 1 of 2000 and section 4 of this report). NII has informed BNFL that priority should be given to reinstatement of assay equipment associated with retrieval, conditioning and safe passive storage of legacy wastes. NII is content that adequate priority is being given to the Drigg assay equipment.

3.6 WASTE RETRIEVAL AND DECOMMISSIONING ACTIVITIES

Site Decommissioning Programme

The company's arrangements for the management of decommissioning of redundant facilities at the BNFL Sellafield site have been reviewed and discussed with BNFL. The company's overall decommissioning policy is regarded as sustainable and the arrangements are generally adequate to enable decommissioning to proceed safely. However, the site arrangements do not provide a clear link between the company's decommissioning policy and individual project implementation programmes. Furthermore, progress against some of the specific projects identified in the "Decommissioning Milestones Programme" is substantially behind the agreed dates.

BNFL has agreed to develop an overall site specific decommissioning strategy which identifies the interactions between and priorities of individual decommissioning projects. In addition an overall site decommissioning plan covering all the safety significant facilities on the Sellafield site will also be submitted to NII.

Licence condition 35 requires a decommissioning programme for each plant or facility on the site. NII recognises that for plants which are expected to remain operational for a number of years the information included in the programme may be indicative only. However, for redundant facilities as well as those nearing the end of their "production" life, a detailed plant specific decommissioning programme is expected. BNFL has been informed that these programmes should identify the events which need to be planned as well as the resources which need to be available to reach the decommissioning end point for the respective plants. Furthermore, each programme should identify key milestones and "hold points" required by the company's management processes and NII as appropriate.

BNFL has agreed that these matters will be resolved before the commencement of the next financial year. A number of these programmes and part of the arrangements for their preparation will be Approved by NII when they have been submitted.

B30

A review of the commitments made by BNFL to decommission this plant over the years together with the options to improve safety has been initiated. It is our view that insufficient priority has been given to this project and that there are reasonably practicable measures which could be implemented to improve safety. When the review has been completed NII will identify the actions and measures which it believes to be necessary together with time scale for their implementation. This may be formalised by regulatory action.

B38

On 20th June BNFL reported that the bulk temperature in compartment 7 had risen above 40 °C. and there was some difficulty in establishing cooling to the compartment. Cooling to adjacent compartments was established on 22 June which resulted in the temperature in compartment 7 being stabilised and subsequently reduced to normal levels. Investigations have confirmed BNFL's view that the conditions were within the safe limits of the safety case and there was no immediate cause for concern. However, NII has required BNFL to investigate why the temperature rise occurred. The plant conditions and the actions of BNFL are being closely monitored.

B41

BNFL has made an application for NII's agreement to start the active commissioning of the argon inerting system. The scope of the request is limited to connection of argon and flooding of the silos with argon; it does not include any operations that might disturb waste. The safety case is currently undergoing assessment. NII will also be assessing other submissions covering phase 2 active commissioning, the tunnel clearance, and foundation work for the overbuilding.

B241

BNFL's preparations to commence commissioning of the sludge retrieval systems have been monitored. NII is generally content with the safe management of this project and work is currently on programme.

3.7 CALDER HALL OPERATIONS

During this quarter, Calder Hall Reactors 2 and 4 were returned to service after their non-statutory outages. Inspection work carried out on the reactors provided adequate support for a further period of operation.

Mr Williams, the Chief Inspector accompanied Steve Lewis, the Calder Hall Site Inspector, on an inspection of the Calder Hall site in May. The Chief Inspector met with senior staff and Calder Hall Safety Representatives as well as being part of a thorough inspection of the Calder Hall site. He was able to satisfy himself with the continued high level of safety on the plant as well as with the continued health of the regulatory interface.

3.8 UKAEA WINDSCALE OPERATIONS

WAGR Decommissioning

During the quarter, problems came to light with minor cracking in the concrete waste containers manufactured for the encapsulation of both low level and intermediate level waste arising from WAGR decommissioning. This has allowed leakage of small amounts of free water through the box wall during the grout curing process. After a pause in operations, UKAEA has established arrangements for the resumption of low level waste disposal. NII is in discussion with UKAEA over the necessary actions to allow the resumption of encapsulation of intermediate level waste which may have to remain in storage for an extended period pending disposal.

4 REGULATORY ACTIVITY

4.1 PROSECUTION BY HSE'S FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

BNFL pleaded guilty to an offence under section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 following an event involving the spillage of a quantity of concentrated Nitric Acid in the Solvent Treatment Plant in March 1999 (see quarter 1 report of 2000). BNFL Engineering Limited also pleaded guilty to an offence under section 3(1) for the same incident. The case was heard at Carlisle Crown Court on 2 June 2000. This resulted in each company being fined £20,000 and required to contribute £34,000 in total towards HSE's costs.

4.2 SATISFACTORY DISCHARGE OF IMPROVEMENT NOTICE

An Improvement Notice was issued in March 2000 requiring a review of the technical requirements for calibration of the plutonium assay instruments in one of the buildings on the site (see quarter 1 report of 2000). This work has been completed by the deadline of 30th June. BNFL submitted a suite of documents and information to enable the Improvement Notice to be discharged. This information has been assessed by NII specialists and the company's proposals to modify the equipment are considered to be sound.

BNFL recognised that the issues associated with Improvement Notice were applicable to other fissile material assay equipment on the site. Consequently the company placed an embargo on their use until the matter had been properly resolved. As the methodology to assess and modify all the assay monitors are very similar NII has accepted BNFL's assurance that the process followed to resolve the instruments subject to the Improvement Notice monitor will be adopted.

At the time of writing this report all fissile assay instruments were still out of service awaiting implementation of the identified modifications.

4.3 SEALED SOURCES

An Improvement Notice was issued in 24 March 1999 requiring improvements to the arrangements for the management of sealed sources. BNFL asked for and was granted an extension to the period for compliance with this notice (31 January 2000). Inspections of the arrangements after the period allowed by the Improvement Notice has led to NII forming the view that insufficient improvements had been made at the workplace. The evidence gathered is currently being reviewed by NII's legal advisor.

4.4 OVEREXPOSURE EVENT

NII is still considering the regulatory response to the overexposure of an individual working in the Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP)

TABLE 1

**QUARTERLY RETURNS FOR
SELLAFIELD, CALDER HALL, DRIGG AND WINDSCALE**

**DURING THE QUARTER
1 APRIL - 30 JUNE 2000**

	BNFL SELLAFIELD ¹	BNFL CALDER HALL ²	BNFL DRIGG	UKAEA WINDSCALE
NUMBER OF VISITS	47	7	2	8
INSPECTION DAYS ON SITE	164	15	2.5	31
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ³	0	0	0	0
Incidents in the quarter likely to be published in HSE's quarterly "Statement of Nuclear Incidents at Nuclear Installations"	0	0	0	0
CONSENTS, APPROVALS	1	0	1	2
LICENCE INSTRUMENTS	4	4	0	0

¹ The figures shown for BNFL Sellafield are those for BNFL's chemical plants. They do not include figures for the plants within the Electricity Generation Group (see note 2 below)

² The figures shown for BNFL Calder Hall are those for the plants on the Sellafield site operated by (or for) the Electricity Generation group, primarily Calder Hall nuclear power plant.

³ An enforcement action may be a Direction issued by HSE under the nuclear site licence, an Improvement Notice, or a Prohibition Notice, or the laying of information in pursuit of a prosecution.

TABLE 2

CONSENTS AND APPROVALS ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER

1 APRIL - 30 JUNE 2000

REF No	DESCRIPTION
BNFL Drigg - Nuclear Site Licence No. 29AF	
8	Approval of Emergency Plan
BNFL Sellafield (Windscale Works and Calder Works) - Nuclear Site Licence No. 31F	
66	Approval of Emergency Plan
UKAEA Windscale - Nuclear Site Licence No. 46A	
19	The lease of B21 to BNFL
20	Approval of Emergency Plan

TABLE 3

LICENCE INSTRUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE QUARTER

1 APRIL - 30 JUNE 2000

REF No	DESCRIPTION
BNFL Drigg Nuclear Site Licence No. 29A	
	None
BNFL Sellafield (Windscale Works and Calder Works) Nuclear Site Licence No. 31F	
310	AMENDMENT OF THE CALDER HALL MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO GRAPHITE PROPERTIES
311	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PLANT MODIFICATION TO AMEND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR INSPECTION AT CALDER HALL
312	SPECIFICATION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPLYING WITH LICENCE CONDITION 36 - CONTROL OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
314	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REACTOR NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE PAPER RNSC(99)P519 ASSOCIATED WITH CALDER HALL
315	AGREEMENT TO ACTIVE COMMISSIONING OF B803 SOLVENT TREATMENT PLANT
316	AGREEMENT TO MODIFY THE 1ST LINE AND ASC FETTAS ON ALL CALDER HALL REACTORS
317	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SAFETY DOCUMENTATION SMF AREA 200 (WBPSM)
318	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SAFETY DOCUMENTATION SMF ATTRITOR MILLS MODIFICATIONS
UKAEA Windscale - Nuclear Site Licence No. 46A	
	None