



**British Nuclear Group report
to the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group
on Thursday 6th October 2005**

This report is issued as part of British Nuclear Group's commitment to ensure information is available to members of the public. It is for distribution to members of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and covers activities associated with:

Operational performance
Progress against British Nuclear Group's clean up activities
Safety and Security
Socio economic issues and employment trends
Forward programme

These reports will be distributed on a 6 monthly basis prior to the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group main scrutiny meetings and will be available in local libraries, local council offices and on the WCSSG website: www.wcssg.co.uk

Representatives from British Nuclear Group attend the WCSSG meetings and will be happy to field any questions raised there.

Operational Performance:

Sellafield MOX Plant

Manufacturing of the first four fuel assemblies in SMP was completed in May 2005, demonstrating to the international nuclear industry British Nuclear Group's capability to supply MOX fuel from reprocessed plutonium at Sellafield. These assemblies were subsequently safely delivered to the Swiss customer representing a significant milestone for the Sellafield MOX plant. Following this success, the programme for the remainder of the financial year is to produce a further 12 assemblies for the same customer.

Magnox Reprocessing

Plant run-down and washout began in April to remove Plutonium and Uranium from the process prior to the start of the planned biennial engineering shutdown. Key features of this shutdown have been refurbishment of the South Charge Machine, re-calibration of the nuclear material accountancy tanks and maintenance of the FHP decanner.

Additional work to that originally planned has been carried out in the Plutonium Finishing area to further raise operational standards and this has resulted in a restart date later than originally planned.

The Magnox plants are now scheduled to re-commence operations in late September.

The Magnox Operating Plan (MOP) which provides the integrated strategy and plans for the operation and defuelling of Magnox reactors and associated reprocessing at Sellafield was updated and re-issued in its 6th edition in May.

Thorp Reprocessing

In April, routine monitoring checks in Thorp led to the discovery of a pipework failure in the plant's Feed Clarification Cell, which holds dissolver solution while accountancy calculations are made.

The discovery was made after a camera inspection of the cell, which is a stainless steel totally secure environment and specifically designed to withstand such pipe failures. The plant's reprocessing operations, including shearing, were immediately closed down to put the plant in a safe, quiescent state.

It was quickly established that around 83m³ of liquid had escaped from the fractured pipe (primary containment) feeding one of the Accountancy Tanks into a purpose built, thick walled concrete cell lined with stainless steel (secondary containment).

The secondary containment was specifically designed for failure of primary containment and is capable of containing liquid in quantities significantly greater than that released in this event. It is fitted with engineered systems to pump liquid from the cell floor back into primary containment tanks within the cell and by mid June, the liquor from the floor had been recovered.

The Company investigation into the incident followed two lines of enquiry covering how and why the failure occurred and the response to it. The key findings are as follows:

- The pipe failed because of metal fatigue. This was caused by stresses arising from the fact that the pipe was attached to a suspended tank (for the purposes of weighing the tank's contents). This is the only area in Thorp (and indeed the rest of Sellafield) in which tanks are operated in this way.
- The secondary containment performed as designed. Once the pipe failed, the material collected in a purpose designed area, preventing release to the environment or harm to any personnel.
- The cause of the failure dates back to a change in design intent when changes to the restraint mechanisms on these suspended tanks were introduced that allowed greater stresses to be exerted on associated pipework than had been anticipated.
- There is some evidence to suggest that the pipe may have started to fail in August 2004. Failure of the pipe (at which point significant amounts of liquor started to be released into

the cell) is believed to have occurred in mid January 2005.

· However, in the period between January 2005 (and perhaps earlier) and 19 April 2005, opportunities, such as cell sampling and level measurements, were missed which would have shown that material was escaping to secondary containment. While the failure could not have been prevented at this stage, had these opportunities been taken the quantity of liquid released could have been significantly reduced.

The investigation made recommendations that fall into three broad categories:

- Ensuring that a detailed engineering review is conducted to confirm that the potential for stress-induced fatigue is adequately addressed across Sellafield.
- Improving the maintenance, testing and reliability of cell instrumentation and other systems that give indications of plant abnormality.
- Reviewing operating practices throughout the plant to ensure that lessons learned are implemented and embedded.

The NII is also conducting its own investigation into the event.

Engineering options for re-instatement of plant operations have been developed and presented to the NDA. Following independent review, further development work is continuing on all options.

High Level Waste Plants

163 containers have been produced to date in the Vitrification Plant against a target of 239. The shortfall in production has predominantly been due to mechanical failures and the need for a thorough review of operating and maintenance procedures to ensure optimisation of environmental impacts of our operations. The year end target to produce 525 containers is now challenging and will require high plant availability over the coming months.

‘Clean-up’ progress

Nuclear cleanup, in the simplest terminology, is described as the decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

Sellafield is an incredibly complex nuclear and industrial site containing a legacy stretching back to the military programmes initiated at the end of WWII. There are numerous facilities fulfilling different purposes, all at varying stages of the nuclear plant lifecycle. Many of the high-hazard facilities identified as top priority by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority are within Cleanup’s remit.

This makes the challenge of cleaning up Sellafield much more formidable than simply decontaminating and decommissioning plant. In particular a major challenge facing the Sellafield site is the retrieval, treatment, and interim storage of significant volumes of raw Intermediate-level Waste (ILW).

Earlier this year the Cleanup Group was established to channel its skill and expertise into safely managing a large number of legacy and modern nuclear facilities, with the purpose of successfully accelerating waste retrieval and decommissioning. The group is organised into 5 major project delivery streams, supported by small and effective functional teams:

Legacy Ponds Project is responsible for retrieving and treating spent nuclear fuel and ILW from high-hazard redundant ponds that supported the early military and civil nuclear programmes.

Legacy Silos Project is responsible for retrieving and treating mixed ILW from high-hazard wet and dry storage silos that supported the early military and civil nuclear programmes.

Decommissioning Project is responsible for the safe and accelerated decommissioning of a range of legacy and more modern facilities. This also involves removal of spent nuclear fuel and ILW, although the quantities are less than contained in the Legacy Ponds and Silos. A significant project this team will deliver is the decommissioning of Calder Hall.

Waste Project is responsible for safely treating Low-level Waste, along with treating and storing all Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) at the Sellafield site. The project also supports the site by minimising and handling all radioactive and non-radioactive decommissioning wastes, and decontaminating materials for free release or resale.

Disposal and Storage Project is responsible for the safe management of the nations only LLW Repository at Drigg. Receiving and storing regular consignments from Sellafield, all other UK nuclear sites, universities, hospitals, and other commercial organisations. The project is also performing retrieval of legacy PCM from the site which is being exported to Sellafield for safe surface storage.

Examples of progress made in the past 6 months are as follows:

Completion of zinc bromide orphan waste treatment and disposal

Building on earlier success in the project, a team at Sellafield has removed all of the available used Zinc Bromide from the site.

Zinc bromide solution is used on the Sellafield site and other nuclear sites as a shielding medium in cave windows. Its high specific gravity provides a good radiation shielding medium and good optical performance, allowing operators to view inside the cave.

As the visibility in the windows deteriorated over time the Zinc Bromide was replaced by lead glass windows creating a stock of used material which was stored awaiting a disposal route.

A total of 30 cubic metres of Zinc Bromide was identified as needing an appropriate disposal route, 21 cubic metres of which was available for immediate disposal. Earlier work saw the repackaging and free release of approx 7 cubic metres of the material, complemented by a further 1.8 cubic metres which was absorbed on to bespoke Bentonite pucks prior to disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository at Drigg. The pucks were designed by the Project team along with Nexia Solutions and manufactured by a local engineering firm.

The remaining 13 cubic metres fell into the category of Exempt under current regulations. The material was immobilised using a super absorbent, a novel technique which allowed the material to be transferred to a licensed waste management company where further solidification and fixation took place prior to disposal at licensed landfill.

Utilising all available technologies represents best practice and offers the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority an industry wide solution.

Picture below shows: Loading of wagon prior to final dispatch of immobilised $ZnBr_2$



Swarf retrieval facility, B38

Following successful equipment trials at the end of last year the B38 decommissioning team has successfully cleaned up the floor of compartment 7 of the swarf retrieval facility, which was heavily contaminated following a spillage five years ago. In order to carry out the work a remotely operated Brokk was required.

The team had to remove around three hundred, 108kg lead blocks, used as shielding, before they could start work on the floor itself. The project was then tackled in two phases: first systems were established for routine cooling of the waste before undertaking the clean up of the compartment 7 operations floor. Ten millimetres of concrete was removed using a remotely operated concrete shaver.

This is a significant milestone in the progress towards B38 operations floor clean-up, a pre-requisite to installation of the B38 silo emptying plant machines and future retrievals.

Calder Hall

The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate has given the go ahead for decommissioning to commence at Calder Hall, following two years of preparatory work and extensive public consultation.

This is only the third time that permission has ever been given to decommission a nuclear power station under legislation introduced in 1999. The legislation requires the production of an extensive Environmental Statement which details the company's proposals for decommissioning through to the ultimate total clearance of the site and also assesses the environmental effects of this decommissioning programme. The Calder Hall Environmental Statement was then submitted to the Health and Safety Executive in August 2004 along with an application to decommission. Prior to giving their consent, the Health and Safety Executive put the document out for public consultation.

Work on removing plants declared redundant prior to the closure of Calder Hall in 2003 had already commenced, the decision means that the de-planting and demolition of some of the major buildings on the site can now begin. Early work will include removal of the internal packing from the main cooling towers in preparation for tower demolition. The first phase of removing all of the site buildings apart from the reactor buildings themselves is expected to take several years.

Throughout the whole process safety to both the workforce and public, and protection of the environment will remain the key priority. The decommissioning process will remain subject to the requirements of the Nuclear Site Licence and other relevant legislation and both the NII and the Environment Agency will remain closely involved in regulating the ongoing work.

Calder Hall Cooling Towers – Demolition

The four nearly identical cooling towers at the Calder Hall Power Station are scheduled for demolition in December 2005. The towers are approximately 88m high, with top, throat and bottom diameters of 32.5, 32m and 58m respectively. The cooling towers were in operation from the late 1950's until generation ceased in March 2003.

Potential demolition methods have been under assessment since the cooling towers became redundant in 2003 and strategy development began in earnest in June 2004. Research

demonstrated that explosive demolition is the standard method for cooling towers based on worker safety and cost effectiveness. Over the past 30 years, more than 200 similar structures have been successfully demolished using the proposed technique.


The technique requires that approximately 60% of the circumference of the shell and legs are removed by explosive charges. This will cause the tower to tilt and collapse approximately five degrees from vertical. It is likely that a small area of the shell will land outside the pond area up to a distance of ten metres.

The Preliminary Safety Report, completed in January 2005, indicated that additional assessments were required to determine potential impacts of the demolition activity on the surrounding plants. The required assessments include:

- Debris and collapse mechanism
- Noise, air overpressure, and projectiles
- Ground vibrations
- Dust release
- Radiological assessment
- Explosive transportation

The assessments are on going, but preliminary indications are that most of the impacts are limited to the Calder Power Station and readily addressed through engineering controls.

Members of the Project Team involved in the demolition will be present during lunch at the next WCSSG meeting to answer any questions you may have.



Waste Project efficiency improvements:

An extensive programme of improvements has resulted in significant gains being made by the Clean-up team, reducing cost and increasing efficiency for a number of projects across the Sellafield site.

Reducing radioactive waste and increasing the amount of recyclable and free-release material is vitally important to cleaning up the Sellafield site. As the clean-up process accelerates, and redundant buildings are decommissioned and demolished, it will inevitably generate a higher volume of waste for disposal.

One of the challenges facing the Clean-up team is minimising the volume of this waste. In response to this, the Waste Project team has implemented an extensive programme of work. An excellent example is the re-categorisation of suspected historic Intermediate Level Waste in an area adjacent to B30. The team performed a full investigation of the waste and found that four cubic metres were actually Low Level Waste. This allowed the material to go to the Low-level Waste Repository (LLWR) for safe disposal, resulting in a massive lifecycle cost saving of £430,000.

Another key step forward this year is to get the B927 Wheelabrator operational. This removes the outer surface of contaminated steel using an abrasion process, resulting in greater volumes of free-release steel. The team also plans to increase Half-height ISO Freight (HHIF) packing efficiency to 50% before the end of the year.

Elsewhere on site, the programme included increasing the packing efficiency of HHIF containers from 30% to 40% and also introducing a skip collection service to the Separation Area to reduce the burden on donor plants and projects.

Sellafield Sealine Pipebridge refurbishment

The Sellafield sealine pipebridge was built in 1949 to carry two pipelines (known as sealines) over the river Ehen and the Barrow-in-Furness to Carlisle coastal railway line. The sealines carry treated process liquids and rainwater from the Sellafield site, discharging approximately 1km from the high water mark. Over the years the original sealines have been replaced with new ones and the pipebridge itself was strengthened in the 1970's and again in the late 1990's.

Over the past 30 years there has been continued focus on improving the environmental performance of the site and this has included reducing the activity discharged through the lines to less than 1% of what it was in the 1970's. All site discharges, including those through the sealines, are closely monitored and controlled in accordance with authorisations from the Environment Agency.

The current work will completely refurbish the pipebridge, including replacement of the bridge piers and deck edge and installation of state-of-the-art protection against corrosion and to prevent scouring of the river bed. Meticulous preparations ensure that clean-up and


production operations at Sellafield will not be affected by the work throughout the 18 month period of the project.

British Nuclear Group has worked closely with Network Rail so that there will be no disruption to the timetable on the Barrow to Carlisle railway line. All work encroaching on the line will be carried out either at night or weekends when there are no scheduled train services. Preparations for the project have included time trials to make sure that all the work can be carried out in the allotted times.

Some restrictions on access in the area will be necessary to protect members of the public from construction activities but the project team will ensure that any disruption is kept to a minimum.

Plans are also underway to remove a nearby temporary bridge which was erected in the 1980's to carry earth to re-profile the 'Ehen Spit' peninsula of land between the river Ehen and the Irish Sea.

The refurbished pipebridge will continue to provide a discharge route for treated effluents from operations and clean-up at Sellafield for at least 30 years.



4 years without a lost time accident

A British Nuclear Group team working on decommissioning the pile fuel storage pond has completed four years without a lost time accident, a fantastic achievement for the team whose activities cover a wide range of work in one of the oldest facilities on the Sellafield site.

Built and commissioned between 1948 and 1952 the pond provided the storage and cooling facility for fuel from the two Windscale reactors (piles).

In recent years, along with the routine operations and maintenance work the team has been involved with significant clean up work including the removal of redundant flasks and debris from the pond. The team is also involved in major design, construction and demolition work associated with preparing the pond for retrieval of sludge and eventual decommissioning.

Completion of tunnel demolition, B41

Total demolition of the B41 Transfer Tunnel on June 6, 2005 signified completion of the first fee-earning cleanup work at Sellafield. Demolition was completed safely and successfully 9 months ahead of the NDA target of March 2006. Tunnel demolition has significantly reduced the risk of seismic collapse and is a major step toward making the silo safe before commencing waste retrievals.

For further information on this project see the attached publication.

Safety:

British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited (BNGSL) is a new company established on 1 April 2005, owned and managed by British Nuclear Group. BNGSL is the Site Licence Company and manages sites on behalf of the newly formed public body Nuclear Decommissioning Authority.

Environment, Health, Safety and Quality (EHS&Q) overriding business priorities are to ensure nuclear safety and environmental consideration. Our relentless pursuit of excellence will be reflected in our health, safety and environmental performance and the quality of the products and services we deliver to our customers. The scope of EHS&Q improvements consists of three workstreams:

- Leadership

A series of presentations is currently being communicated to all managers and team leaders across the Sellafield Site providing information on 'learning from events'. The goal is to reiterate priorities to all personnel in a leadership role and provide clarification on responsibility and accountabilities. There is an ongoing commitment to engaging leaders and developing leadership competencies with a series of workshops over the next six months commencing with a 'Pro-active leadership' event. This will lead to us being a continually learning and improving organisation with clear objectives.

- Focus on Fundamentals

We are currently taking the opportunity to benchmark against the best in the worldwide nuclear industry and from that enhance competencies in areas of nuclear safety and environmental awareness. The company is maintaining its certification to Environmental and Quality Management Systems ISO14001 and ISO9001 and continues to be recognised with a number of RoSPA awards including a Commendation in the Manufacturing Industry Sector award and a prestigious gold medal for Calder Hall.

Mid-way through the year BNGSL Days Away Case Rate (DACR) is 0.23 which is online to meet the end of financial year objective of 0.20. The Total Recordable

Incidence Rate (TRIR) for BNGSL has fallen to 0.32 and is making improvement to meet the 0.26 objective.

- Drive for Excellence

Our long-term goal is an injury and incident-free environment with a DACR and TRIR of zero within three years. To enable us to achieve this goal, we have a site improvement plan detailing the three messages:

- Leadership;
- Focus on Fundamentals;
- Drive for Excellence.

We will continue to benchmark against the Best in Class and aim to create a culture where everyone is safe and environmentally responsible in all their actions at all times.

Security:

Following the events of 7th July 2005 in London, in common with all Government establishments, Sellafield moved to a higher state of alert (AMBER), though we have no reason to believe that any of our facilities were under threat. The alert state is determined by the Home Secretary. The Minister also decides the duration of any alert state. The increased alert state disrupted access to the site for one day, until appropriate car parking arrangements could be implemented on site and off site. Permanent arrangements have been put in place to mitigate future disruption in the event of a similar increase in alert state.

Civil nuclear sites apply stringent security measures regulated by the Department of Trade and Industry's Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS). In conjunction with OCNS security arrangements at Sellafield are under continual review. As part of the ongoing security enhancement programme additional protective measures are being put in place at the points of entry to the site. These measures include nuclear material detection equipment, similar to those installed at UK & US port authorities. They include traffic monitoring and recording equipment, similar to that used by Highways Agency. Other enhancements have been made to areas within the site, similar to the aviation industry. For obvious reasons it would be inappropriate for us to discuss these enhancements further.

Socio economic impacts

British Nuclear Group has produced a socio-economic plan for 2005/06 and presented this to the NDA in May 2005.

The aims of the plan are to :

- ensure we are addressing the socio-economic needs of the NDA and the local community

- work in partnership with the local council representatives and the various agencies
- provide some stability and continuity for projects the site has traditionally supported

The funding criteria will continue to support 3 main areas:

- economic regeneration
- community/social sector projects
- education

The major projects supported (or to be supported) during this financial year are :

- West Cumbria Development Fund (WCDF)/ West Cumbria Development Agency (WCDA)
 - *job creation/retention*
- Westlakes Research Institute (WRI)
 - *higher education links/consultancy development*
- GEN II
 - *training/skills development*
- Cumbria Inward Investment Agency (CIIA)
- Social sector projects
 - *Prince's Trust*
 - *Whitehaven Community Trust*
 - *Weston Spirit*
- Education
 - *Engineering Education Scheme etc*
 - *Educational resources*

During the year through dialogue with various stakeholders other strategic projects will emerge which will be supported through the socio-economic plan.

The strategy is aimed at providing support to :

- develop the supply chain
- develop existing and new businesses
- include socio-economic requirements in sub-contracts
- retain and develop skills (National Nuclear Academy, University of Cumbria)

Employment trends

	Apr 05	May 05	June 05	July 05	Aug 05	Sept 05
British Nuclear Group SMC	52	52	51	50	53	Not available
Clean up	1019	1022	1027	1250	1255	
Functions	2419	2421	2463	2464	2545	
Infrastructure	1975	1979	1991	1953	2151	
Production Operations	3819	3827	3826	3824	3823	
Other business	681	672	636	415	150	
Totals	9965	9973	9994	9956	9977	

Breakdown into BNFL, CSW, ASW

BNFL - British Nuclear Fuels Ltd
 CSW - Contract supplied workers
 ASW - Agency supplied workers

April 05	BNFL	CSW	ASW	Total
Clean up	895	27	97	1019
Functions	1936	147	336	2419
Infrastructure	1566	71	338	1975
Production ops	3509	55	255	3819
Other business	561	51	69	681

May 05	BNFL	CSW	ASW	Total
Clean up	898	34	90	1022
Functions	1937	143	341	2421
Infrastructure	1568	72	339	1979
Production ops	3498	66	263	3827
Other business	547	50	75	672

June 05	BNFL	CSW	ASW	Total
Clean up	901	36	90	1027
Functions	1935	170	358	2463
Infrastructure	1573	75	343	1991
Production ops	3491	59	276	3826
Other business	525	44	67	636

July 05	BNFL	CSW	ASW	Total
Clean up	1077	60	113	1250
Functions	1928	171	365	2464
Infrastructure	1526	76	351	1953
Production ops	3487	61	276	3824
Other business	350	27	38	415

August 05	BNFL	CSW	ASW	Total
Clean up	1069	61	125	1255
Functions	1952	195	398	2545
Infrastructure	1703	80	368	2151
Production ops	3477	58	288	3823
Other business	140	0	10	150

In addition, over the summer British Nuclear Group has employed 10 local students on Summer placements and bursary schemes which is targeted at students who are studying courses relevant to the business.

The apprentice intake this year, through Gen II is 45 which is the same level as recent years.

Forward Programme October 05 to March 06

Life Cycle Baselines LCBL and Near Term Work Plans NTWP.

The LCBL 3s for MSS sites - Sellafield, Calder, LLW at Drigg and Capenhurst have been submitted to the NDA at the end of September 05. LCBL 3 reviews with the NDA are scheduled for October 05. The next NTWPs for 06/07 and LCBL 4s are to be delivered as combined submissions in mid March 06.

Contract Targets – Performance Based Incentives PBI.

There are 91 PBIs in total for 2005/6. 74 are currently on or ahead of target. Eight PBIs are not expected to recover to the target level by the year end. Two Magnox Decanning PBI's are not expected to reach the target level following the delay to the restart of Magnox reprocessing. Three THORP PBIs are on hold and discussions are ongoing with the NDA.

Operations

Magnox reprocessing will continue to the end of the financial year following a delayed restart in early October. The delay was due to completing the Plutonium Finishing Line safety case to meet NII requirements.

THORP reprocessing remains suspended whilst the Feed Clarification Cell Remedial Project work is completed and other improvements and actions arising from the event investigation are carried out. The target date for restart is 6th February 06.

MOX fuel manufacture is currently behind programme but it is anticipated that the year end target will still be achieved.

Vitrification performance is behind programme but it is anticipated that the year end target will still be achieved.

Projects

Legacy Ponds and Silos Clean up: A number of acceleration opportunities have been identified and are being progressed. Three work packages [value £2.8m] have already been implemented in Period 5. A further six work packages [value £14m] will be implemented over the coming two to three months. These packages cover work in B41 Original Dry Silo, B38 Magnox Storage Silos, Sellafield Drypac Plant SDP, B29 Sludge Packing Plant SPP1 and B207 Demolition.

Redundant sea discharge lines: removal will be completed before the financial year end weather permitting.

Residues Export Facility: Installation work will continue ready for the start of inactive commissioning from February 06.

Sellafield Product and Residues Store: Construction of the first row of store modules will be progressed following the main contract signature in September 05. This first row should now be available in October 06.

BNF Technology Centre completion: This work is being progressed specifically at NDAs direction following hand over from NEXIA earlier this year. Commissioning work will continue to financial yearend together with the preparation and submission of the required safety documentation.

Highly Active Liquor Evapourator D: This project has recently been launched and is in the definition phase. A fourth evapourator may be required to mitigate the risk of a significant breakdown or failure of the current facilities. Optioneering and definition work will continue to the yearend.

Stores Consolidation Project: Rationalisation and closure of redundant stores will be progressed with six more to be closed this year to reach the target of twelve.

List of Acronyms:

AMBER	-	Level of security status
BNGSL	-	British Nuclear Group Limited
DACR	-	Days Away Case Rate
EHS&Q	-	Environment, Health, Safety and Quality
FHP	-	Fuel Handling Plant

HHIF	-	Half-height ISO freight
ILW	-	Intermediate Level Waste
ISO	-	International Organisation for Standardisation
LCBL	-	Life Cycle Base Line
LLW	-	Low Level Waste
LLWR	-	Low Level Waste Repository
MOP	-	Magnox Operating Plan
MOX	-	Mixed Oxide
MSS	-	Management Services Sellafield
NDA	-	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
NII	-	Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
OCNS	-	Office of Civil Nuclear Security
PBI	-	Performance Based Incentives
PCM	-	Plutonium Contaminated Material
RoSPA	-	Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents
SDP	-	Sellafield Drypac plant
SPP	-	Sludge Packing Plant
SMP	-	Sellafield Mox Plant
TRIR	-	Total Recordable Incidence Rate
WCSSG	-	West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group
WWII	-	World War II
ZnBr ₂	-	Zinc Bromide