

# Office for Nuclear Regulation

An agency of HSE

Half yearly site report for

**SELLAFIELD, CALDER HALL AND WINDSCALE**

**WEST CUMBRIA SITES STAKEHOLDER GROUP**

**EMERGENCY PLANNING SUB COMMITTEE**

**REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 MARCH 2011 – 31 AUGUST 2011**

## Foreword

This report is issued as part of the Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above sites available to the public. Reports are distributed half yearly to members of the Emergency Planning Sub Committee of the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and cover activities associated with emergency planning at Sellafield, Calder Hall and Windscale. The reports are also available on the ONR website ([www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/llc](http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/llc)).

Site Inspectors from ONR attend the Emergency Planning Sub Committee meetings and will be happy to respond to any questions raised there. Any other person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact the ONR.

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## **1 INTRODUCTION**

This is a summary of the areas that have been the focus of regulatory effort over the past six months, and a forward look to those areas where effort will be spent in the future.

## **2 AREAS COVERED**

### **2.1 Level 1 Demonstration Exercises**

On 12 May we witnessed the Level 1 Exercise “Mallard”. The exercise scenario, which involved the collapse of a construction crane in the vicinity of the Pile Fuel Cladding Silo [PFCS], was extremely well thought out and presented a challenging but reasonably foreseeable event.

We were satisfied with the overall performance of the site, apart from activities at the combined Access Control Point and Incident Control Centre (ACP/ICC). At the ACP/ICC there was ineffective communications and poor team working, which in turn resulted in a failure to recognise the threats to nuclear safety and delays in responding to the event. We therefore requested a local re-demonstration of the combine ACP/ICC, as we wished to be confident that the facility could be utilised effectively in dealing with an incident.

Sellafield Ltd (SL) implemented remedial measures that included command & control training for Incident Controllers and further clarification of roles and responsibilities. We agreed another challenging scenario for the re-demonstration which again involved containment damage to the PFCS. We witnessed a local re-demonstration on 29 June where the remedial measures proved to be effective. Performance at the ACP/ICP was good, with good team working and very good command and control.

SL produced an action plan, to address lessons from the Level 1 Exercise, and these were discussed with us at the Emergency Exercise Review Group (EERG) meeting on 23 June. An action plan for the re-demonstration exercise will be included as an appendix to the Level 1 action plan, and we will check the timely implementation of the plan.

### **2.2 Emergency Management Arrangements**

#### **2.2.1 Emergency Management Improvement Programme.**

During July we checked progress in the delivery of the programme. Although SL said that progress had been made in a number of areas, an update of the programme was not available and it was not easy for SL to demonstrate where progress had actually been made. We checked progress against the review and issue of the Severe Accident Management Strategies (SAMs), and the work on severe accident analyses (SAAs), and were disappointed to find SL was several months behind. SL has committed to give this work priority as part of its wider programme aimed at improving emergency arrangements.

SL's work on Hazard Identification & Risk Evaluation (HIRE) was also behind programme, However, some very useful meetings were held in August to establish a way forward.

### **2.2.2 Licence Condition 11 (Emergency Arrangements) Site Wide Inspection**

Progress in dealing with our findings, from our site-wide inspection undertaken in June last year, was discussed in July. We were disappointed to find that many of the commitments given, to address identified shortfalls, were some months behind.

### **2.2.3 Licence Condition 11 (Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP))**

As mentioned in our last report, during the site wide inspection on Licence Condition 11 undertaken in June last year, we raised concerns regarding management and supervision on WVP. We reviewed the position in July and were disappointed to find that, despite having received assurances we found that little significant progress had been made.

We have requested that SL attend a meeting at Bootle to explain the measures that SL have and will be taking to address the compliance shortfalls.

### **2.2.4 Emergency Arrangements Recovery Plan**

We are disappointed that SL has failed to meet numerous commitments in the area of emergency arrangements, and this matter will be discussed at our six monthly meeting with the SL Directors in August.

In the meantime we have requested SL to produce a detailed and adequately resourced programme to address the matters above, and we will work closely with SL to facilitate progress and to ensure that it is well placed to recover the situation.

## **2.3 Fukushima**

We continue to be engaged with SL on the review work that is being undertaken by the SL Resilience Project Team following the earthquake/tsunami which affected Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant on 11<sup>th</sup> March 2011. SL has been required to produce responses to both the "stress tests" reviews that have been requested by the European Commission and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and to the 26 recommendations contained within the ONR Chief Inspectors Interim report on the Fukushima event. SL has now produced the required interim reports covering these reviews demonstrating the commitment to complete the safety assessments and their final reports by the requested dates. We will continue discussions with the SL Resilience Project team and in the next report we will comment on the recommendations made within the SL final reports on the identified measures to enhance the resilience of the facilities on the Sellafield Site.

### **3 FOCUS OF FUTURE REGULATORY EFFORT**

Some of the areas where we will be focussing our effort are given below.

- a) Follow up work as a result of Fukushima
- b) Improvements in the management of emergencies across the site.
- c) Assessment of the improved SAMs and SAAs.
- d) Improved learning from all emergency exercises.
- e) Facility Emergency Exercises

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