

EXERCISE REPORT



Site	Sellafield
Name and Type of Exercise	Mallard Level 1 demonstration
Date of Exercise	12 th May 2011

REPORTING AREAS	DETAILS
Brief Description of Exercise Scenario	A crane collapsed, dropping its load of re-bar. This resulted in damage to the Pile Fuel Cladding Silo (PFCS) building and fracture of an Argon supply pipe. The Argon release produced an asphyxiating atmosphere, and loss of Argon to the PFCS led to an increased risk of a silo fire. A pipebridge was also damaged resulting in the release of radioactive liquor.
Summary of Aims and Objectives	To demonstrate to the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) the adequacy of the Sellafield Ltd site and plant emergency arrangements. Objectives include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of the Site Emergency Management Organisation - Prompt declaration of appropriate emergency state - Assessment of incident area status and formulation and implementation of actions to return to a safe state - Effective implementation of countermeasures to protect the workforce and advise off-site organisations.
Positive outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good Command & Control and effective teamwork in the Site Emergency Control Centre (SECC). • Excellent support to the SECC from the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC). • Good management, teamworking and operation within

	<p>the new Contaminated Casualty Facility.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timely communications issued to the workforce, agencies, public and media.
Negative outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The joint Incident Control Centre /Access Control Point (ICC/ACP) did not operate well as a combined centre. • Numerous requests for individuals to leave site for personal reasons diverted some Workforce Information Centre staff away from the roll call task.
Learning Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Root cause analysis is required to identify and rectify the reasons for the poor performance of the joint ICC/ACP. • Clarity required on the transportation available for evacuees and plant experts. • Consideration of the risks, and worst case scenario, needs to be made more visible on the boards.
Regulators comments (If applicable)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decommissioning emergency planners commended on a challenging but reasonably foreseeable scenario. • Good information pack provided to SECC by the plant experts, which should be considered as good practice. • A local re-demonstration exercise is required regarding the operation of the ICC/ACP.